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ESSENTIALS OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY


ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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"INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY"



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PREFACE

This book is written specifically for the purpose of developing the "problem-getting" method of education. To this end, the main attention has been given to the formulation of the "problems" which appear in connection with the theme or themes of the chapters. Each of the "problems" has been tried out in the classroom and found productive of constructive thought on the part of students. These exercises are intended to set the student at work, and to stimulate him to do his own thinking.

The student who has an introductory acquaintance with social psychology should begin the study of each chapter with the problems. To these problems, he should first seek answers in his own experiences and observations; then he may inquire of others; he may look for further hints in the context of each chapter, and search through the findings of the specialists whose related works are cited in the lists of selected references at the close of the chapters. If the student has an inadequate background for giving his attention first to the exercises, he may read the context, not as an end in

itself, but as a method of preparation for attacking the problems. The context of each chapter should not be "remembered," but utilized as a means of finding answers, seeing new relationships, and making new discoveries. If the student comes into the class-room *remembering*, this book is intended to send him out *thinking*.

The second aim of the author has been to write a treatise which would meet the needs of the undergraduate student in colleges, junior colleges, and normal schools. The subject of social psychology is of such vital, far-reaching, and practical importance that every college student should be introduced to a scientific consideration of the field. Every such student is compelled to study the psychology of the individual; but few are required or even encouraged to study the psychology of the interactions of individuals in their multifarious group relationships. Surely the latter phenomena are of as vital importance as the former.

A third need which this book aims to meet arises in connection with the method of organizing the subject-matter of social psychology. To some writers, social psychology consists chiefly of a study of the social nature and the social activities of the individual; to other authors, the subject consists largely of an analysis of the psychic interactions of the members of groups. The first emphasis is essentially subjective, genetic, psychological; the second is chiefly objective and sociological.

But the new science of social psychology must develop its own methodology and speak from its own vantage ground. Its sector of the field of the social sciences is that important territory where the activities of psychology and sociology overlap. Instead of allowing its advance to be directed from either psychological or sociological headquarters, it must develop its own methods and programs, but remain subject, of course, to the rules of scientific and of social science procedure. It is true that according to another view, social psychology has no distinct field and must be either psychology, or sociology; but the probabilities are that time will prove this conception to have been a mistaken one.

It is the plan of this book, and of the courses in social psychology which have preceded the writing thereof, to begin the discussion with the psychological bases of social psychology, to analyze the social characteristics of the individual, to consider the social operation of these characteristics, to study the group, the types of groups, and the nature of group conflicts, to investigate the psychology of leadership, as well as the psychology of social control, and to close with an analysis of world progress. The method is inductive, evolutionary, cumulative; it moves from the particular to the general, from the individual to the group, and from the group to mankind, and it culminates in the subject of social progress.

The writer is indebted to so many authors that it is impossible to make adequate acknowledgments. The interest of the writer in the subject was awakened by Professor G. H. Mead; the books and syllabi which have been the most helpful are those of Professors McDougall, Tarde, Ross, Howard, Baldwin, and Ellwood. For the stimulus to develop the "problem-getting" method of teaching and for encouragement in the preparation of the manuscript, I am indebted to Dr. E. C. Moore. For many of the problems that are given at the close of each chapter, I am under obligation to various persons, but chiefly Professor Ross and my advanced students. Sometimes a re-phrasing of a quotation or quoted exercise has been necessary, in which case it has not been feasible to use quotation marks and thus to indicate my indebtedness. The encouragement and suggestions of Professor George Elliott Howard, who has read the manuscript, are gratefully acknowledged.

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

University of Southern California

February 21, 1918

ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.

Social psychology as at present considered is based upon the facts and principles of general psychology. Upon these fundamental data must the foundations of social psychology be laid. It is necessary, first of all, therefore, to consider the characteristics of the human mind in action. This field includes an understanding of the nature and types of the instinctive, of the habitual, and of the conscious reactions of the human mind. The conscious reactions of individuals, upon analysis, are seen to have their affective, cognitive, and volitional phases.

An important group of instinctive reactions, namely, the social instincts, comprises so basic a factor in the study of social psychology that it calls for special attention. As examples of the social instincts, there are the gregarious, the sex and parental, the curiosity instincts. Then there are other closely related social phases of the life of the individual which invite examination,

such as sympathy, the emotions, the sentiments, character, the social self, the "looking-glass self," language, laughter, suggestion, and imitation.

The psychology of group life, as such, the classification of groups, the conflicts between groups, the psychology of the crowd and of the public are vital phases of social psychology. The outstanding features of group life and group conflicts are leadership and social control. It is the individual who initiates, who works over the ideas of his time into new and advanced forms; it is the group which appropriates and adopts the inventions of the few. It is the individual who stimulates the group; it is the group which chokes off the initiative of the individual. The unanswered question arises: How much and what kind of control shall the group exercise in order that the individual members may co-ordinate themselves and function as one brain, and in order that the group may progress?

Social psychology is the scientific study of the social nature and reactions of the mind, of the interactions of individuals within groups, of group conflicts, of group leadership and control, and of the nature of group and societal progress. Social psychology approaches the problems of life from the psychological viewpoint; it draws conclusions and offers programs with reference to societal ends. Social psychology studies the social phases of personality, the interactions of personalities within groups, and the nature of group control and progress.

II.

Social psychology lends itself to the "problem-getting" method of study. The student must not assume a memorizing attitude, but a problem-getting method of approach. He must have "problems", or targets. He can become an efficient student only by keeping problems, or targets, constantly before his mind. He must read, not for the purpose of memorizing, but in order to find answers and solutions. If he has no problems in mind, his reading, or even his so-called studying, is practically of little value. As no one can develop skill as a marksman except by aiming at targets in his practice work, so no student can acquire thorough methods, for example, in social psychology, except by keeping problems, or targets, constantly before his mind. Who is more foolish than a would-be marksman who spends hour after hour shooting in all directions but at no particular object, or target? Target-hitting is the worth-while achievement in marksmanship, and problem-solving is the valuable goal in studying.¹

For this reason, exercises have been formulated and given prominence at the end of each chapter. The plan involves a study of the problems first of all. The student is expected to search his own mind, his own experience, and the experiences of others, for solutions of the given problems. Then the subject matter of

¹ Moore, E. C., *What is Education*, Ch. VIII.

the respective chapters may be consulted for securing further light, and finally the readings at the close of each chapter will afford additional help.

III.

The literature on social psychology is so extensive that it may be grouped under certain heads. Only representative and leading books in each group can be mentioned. The student will need to refer frequently to the representative works in psychology proper, such as the psychologies which bear the names of James, Royce, Titchener, Thorndike, Angell, Pillsbury, and others.

In social psychology, there are several well known books. McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* affords the student a fundamental discussion of the nature of the social instincts and of their functioning in society. Ross' *Social Psychology* is widely used as a text. While it does not inquire into the social nature of the individual, nor into the genesis of social attitudes of individuals, it enters extensively into a discussion of the operation of suggestion and imitation in society. Custom imitation, conventionality imitation, and fashion imitation, are central themes. Where Mr. McDougall concludes his analysis, Professor Ross begins; their two books have little in common except the title. Professor Ross' *Social Control* is undoubtedly the best book upon the subject that is stated in the

title, and constitutes an excellent supplement to his *Social Psychology*.

Human Nature and the Social Order and *Social Organization* by Charles H. Cooley should be studied in order, because together they form a well-balanced system of thought in social psychology. The first centers about the individual and his social nature; the second about the nature of group-life and of group control through the organization of the members of the group.

Gabriel Tarde's *Laws of Imitation* explains at considerable length the operation of imitation in society. In *Social Laws*, Tarde gives a succinct summary of his main ideas concerning the psychical processes going on in society. His *La logique sociale, L'opinion et la foule*, and related works are of first rank. *Psychical Interpretations of Society* by Michael M. Davis, Jr. reviews historically and critically the literature of a socio-psychological nature, and summarizes and criticizes Tarde's theory of imitation. Professor J. Mark Baldwin has written *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, which presents a fundamental analysis of the nature and characteristics of the social self from the genetic point of view. The best syllabus (including the most comprehensive bibliography) for the study of social psychology is that prepared by Professor George Elliott Howard.

Professor Charles A. Ellwood in his *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects* and in the recent *Introduction*

to *Social Psychology* has given a careful and synthetic statement of the nature and function of the leading psychic elements operating in social progress. From a point of view somewhat philosophic and socialistic, *The Great Society* by Graham Wallas, gives keen analyses of social processes. In *The Crowd* and *The Psychology of the Great War*, well-known books by Gustave LeBon, the reader needs to be prepared for an exaggerated form of crowd and mob psychology. Related works are those by Scipio Sighele. A new field of social psychology is that which treats of the psychological explanations of social origins; the work of Professor W. I. Thomas in *Sex and Society* and in the *Source Book for Social Origins* is an outstanding example. Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution* and Sumner's *Folkways* may also be mentioned in this connection. For further references, the reader may turn to the end of each chapter and to the selected list which is given in the closing pages of this book.²

² After this manuscript was in the hands of the printer, Volume XII of the Publications of the American Sociological Society was published. It is entitled *Social Control*. The volume contains thirteen papers dealing with the history and problems of social control; it is an indispensable document for the social psychologist. It was planned by Professor George Elliott Howard and was edited by Professor Scott E. W. Bedford.

PROBLEMS

1. At the outset of this study, what meaning does the term "social psychology" have to you?

2. What is the relation of the psychological phases of sociology to social psychology?

3. Which is the more important for the study of social psychology, a knowledge of psychology or of sociology?

4. Distinguish between individual psychology and social psychology.

5. Which is the more useful, the study of individual psychology or the study of social psychology?

6. Explain: "The older psychology was individualistic in its interpretations."

7. Why has the American been primarily an individualist?

8. Is the American youth today more of an individualist than his father? Why?

9. Distinguish between racial psychology and social psychology.

10. Is social psychology an old or new subject?

11. Explain the recent rapid development of social psychology.

12. What meaning do you see in the terms "individual ascendancy" and "social ascendancy"?

13. Would an abnormal development of either "individual ascendancy" or "social ascendancy" be good for a community? Why?

14. When do you feel of greater importance,—on a mountain alone, or in a crowd?

15. What aim may one have in studying social psychology?

16. What constitutes the laboratory of the student of social psychology?

17. Do you expect that the study of social psychology will make you more dependent upon others, or more independent of others?

18. Who are the founders of modern social psychology?

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CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

I.

The study of social psychology is based on a knowledge of psychological principles. It is apropos that attention be given here to the more important facts of psychology which are essential to an understanding of our field.

Psychology may be divided into two branches, structural and functional. The former treats chiefly of the states of consciousness, while the latter describes the mind in action. It is in functional psychology that the social psychologist is directly interested. Functional psychology furnishes the principles for interpreting the social nature of individuals and for understanding the interactions in group life.

The reactions of the mind may be divided into three general classes, namely, (1) instinctive, (2) habitual, and (3) conscious. Instinctive tendencies are based on ready-made, inborn co-ordinations. They represent psychical acquisitions which have been biologically trans-

mitted. They have been described by Mr. McDougall as representing pre-formed pathways in the nervous system and as having been made in response to the demands of previous life-conditions.¹ They have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of species to environment.

In every case, according to Mr. McDougall, some sense-impression or combination of sense-impressions excites a perfectly definite behavior or some movement or train of movements. The result is the same in all individuals of the species and on all similar occasions. In general, the behavior thus caused promotes (1) the welfare of the individual, (2) perpetuates the species, or (3) advances the welfare of the given group.

These innate or inherited tendencies are the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action, whether individual or collective.² They are the foundations upon which character is developed. All that we learn and all of our mastery of life is constructed upon the basis of our instincts. Our later adaptations are modifications of these original, inherited reactions.

The instinctive tendencies are also at the root of our social life. The social interactions between individuals, no matter how complex these interactions may become, rest upon the instincts. All social structures and institutions have their beginnings in instincts. Back of the

¹*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. II.

²*Ibid.*, p. 44.

family as a social institution are the sex and parental impulses; back of fraternal organizations is the gregarious instinct.

II.

The failure of an instinct to function successfully in a new situation leads to the appearance of consciousness and the re-construction of the instinctive way of acting. The modification may be slight, or almost entirely new. These modifications when repeated become habitual. Habits both new and old, likewise may be disturbed, and through the action of consciousness may be made over. Habits are modifications of instincts or of previously formed habits. The concept of "crisis", as used by Professor W. I. Thomas, is a useful tool in in this connection; it refers to the disturbance of an established way of doing, the concentration of attention, and the development of a new method as a resultant.

The actions of the lower forms of animal life are mostly tropistic, reflex, or instinctive. Higher animals adapt, within narrow limits, their instinctive actions to peculiar circumstances. Man has modified his instincts so completely that they operate almost entirely in hidden ways.

It is our privilege as human beings deliberately to modify our instincts and old habits, and to build up new habits which will make us masters of ourselves and, in a sense, of our environment. Within limits, an

individual normally situated can acquire habits in almost any direction of growth that he wills.

Habitual reactions are of distinct advantage to the individual in several ways.³ (1) They reduce the necessary time of action. (2) They increase accuracy. (3) They reduce the attendant fatigue. (4) They release the mind from the necessity of paying attention to the details of the successive steps of an act. (5) They give a permanency to experience. In other words, the custom of deprecating habits is not entirely correct. If it is true that the man who is in the grip of habit with reference to certain methods of acting is a slave, it may be true also that he is the most truly free to advance. No one can make rapid progress until he has succeeded in establishing a mass of useful habits. Or, as Professor C. E. Seashore has said, nothing is well done until it is reduced to an automatic stage.⁴ Habits signify social reliability. A person with strength of character has a number of well-organized habits. The reliability of an individual is due to habitual reactions. His honesty or dishonesty in dealing with others is largely a matter of habit; he who can be trusted is the person who is honest by habit.

³ Scott, W. D., *Increasing Human Efficiency in Business*, Ch. III.

⁴ *Psychology in Daily Life*, p. 89.

III.

In addition to instinctive and habitual tendencies, there are marginal reactions which are conscious. Conscious reactions appear chiefly at those points where the neuro-physiological mechanism is incapable of meeting the demands of the environment, that is, where instinctive and habitual reactions fail. Consciousness appears where changes, or new adjustments, are necessary; it is related to the process known as adjustment to environment. It may be said to have three characteristics: (1) affective, or the feeling phase; (2) cognitive, or the thinking phase; and (3) volitional, or the "willing" phase.⁵

The feelings are closely related to the instincts. While they are perhaps as old in their origin as the instinctive tendencies, the development of the feeling side of life came later, phylogenetically, than that of the instinctive phase. Agreeable feelings accompany those ideas which further our momentary interests; while disagreeable feelings characterize the ideas which obstruct or thwart those interests, according to Professor J. R. Angell.⁶ With a slight modification the statement of Professor Ellwood may be accepted, namely, that feeling is the agreeable or disagreeable tone of consciousness that accompanies an idea or an activity.⁷ An act

⁵ Miller, I. E., *The Psychology of Thinking*, pp. 64 ff.

⁶ *Psychology*, p. 315.

⁷ *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 64.

which as a rule has been favorable in the past to the organism and to the race produces an agreeable tone of consciousness; an experience which as a type has been unfavorable in past times to the individual and to the race produces a disagreeable tone of consciousness. The agreeable or disagreeable tone appears quickly and in far less time than is required to analyze and to evaluate that act. In other words, the feeling character of consciousness gives a quicker-than-thought evaluation to a given activity upon the basis of the past experience, not only of the organization itself, but also of the race.

A pleasurable feeling that accompanies a given idea indicates that in the history of the organism or of the race, the group of acts to which the given idea is related has been helpful and constructive. The pleasurable tone does not necessarily indicate the present value of a given act. The fact that a type of acts in the past has been helpful or harmful indicates that in all probability this type will continue to be helpful or harmful.

People are peculiarly alike in their feelings, an observation which has been explained on the basis of the fact that people have had about the same racial experience. In this long racial history, certain ways of doing have been favorable to race development, and others, unfavorable. Current actions fall into certain groupings as regards this racial experience and the result in all individuals is the same, an agreeable or disagreeable tone of consciousness, in accordance with favorable or unfavorable racial experiences.

It has been observed that it is difficult to argue against the feelings. The reasons are many. A main explanation is that the feeling phase of consciousness is outside the range of the cognitive side. Cognition can recognize, classify, and describe the events leading up to the expression of a given feeling, but can not do much else. An idea thrown against a feeling by way of argument travels on a different plane. Feelings can be "argued against" best through the stimulation of counter feelings.

Then, it may also be said that the feeling side of consciousness developed much earlier, phylogenetically, than cognition. The feelings are older, phylogenetically, than defined ideas. In some ways, the feelings are closer to the inner citadel of the self than are thoughts.

He who acts according to his feelings acts usually in harmony with the dictates of racial experience. He thus acts wisely in-so-far as racial history is similar to current conditions. But conditions of life, both physical and social, are constantly undergoing change. Hence, racial experience is not always a safe guide; another factor is necessary.

This element is found in cognition, which is the core of consciousness. Cognition developed to enable the organism to adjust itself to new factors in the environment. If there are no new problems to solve, then the feelings—as representing past experience—would be sufficient. But in a social environment which is so

characterized by change, and in which so many new situations are constantly arising, the feelings are an inadequate guide. A new element is required; cognition meets this need. With the feeling phase of consciousness for the evaluation of acts on the basis of past history, and with the cognitive side for the evaluation of acts on the basis of present conditions and future probabilities, the organism is well equipped for the solution of the problems of life.

As the social environment is more changeable and gives rise to more new problems than the physical environment, cognition may be said, in a sense, to be a social product. Its development has come in response to the changing elements in the social environment. Even in the case of a child brought up away from people, it is probable that his cognitive characteristics would remain undeveloped. Or, in the case of an ordinary individual, the effects of an unusually stimulating social and mental environment are clearly seen. Professor Ross has used the term, "high potential of the city," in referring to the relatively large number of mental stimulations which come to an individual in a day and which result in increased mental activities.

The highest form of cognition is reason. Pure reason takes cognizance of factors present in neither time nor space; it considers a larger environment than that present to the senses. It is a supreme adjuster. It helps

the individual to adjust himself to the factors of a universal environment.⁸

The third characteristic of consciousness is the volitional. In the simpler sense, the volition is the acting side of consciousness; in a developed form, it is the choosing phase. Consciousness can make evaluations, not only upon the basis of past experience, and with reference to present needs and future probabilities, but it can also make choices and act upon them.

Every idea is dynamic; every idea tends to be carried out. This motor characteristic of ideas is at the basis of volition. But volition includes the power of choosing. While many choices are probably made upon bases which are quite largely determined by hereditary and environmental factors, there is left a certain margin wherein the individual may make original choices. This margin of freedom in choosing is undoubtedly a result of selection. Individuals with this margin of freedom survive better and are able to adjust themselves more satisfactorily to their social environment with its elements of change than persons without this leeway. The margin of freedom of choice would be useless in a static environment, or in a purely physical, materialistic, and mechanistic universe. Thus, it is seen that volition has its fundamental roots in the changing factors of the social environment.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 67, 68.

The margin of freedom in making choices varies. When health conditions are unfavorable, when poverty pinches, or when wealth stifles, the margin shrinks. It is probable that the margin varies from hour to hour with every individual; but for nearly all individuals most of the time, this degree of freedom in choosing is in many ways the most significant psychical characteristic that they possess.

The marginal degree of freedom means that the individual is not completely plastic. He is relatively independent of his environment. His innate and organic needs unite with his acquired habitual methods and his margin of freedom in determining what stimuli in the environment he shall respond to and which he shall ignore. Unconsciously and consciously, the organism makes choices among the countless stimuli with which it is being constantly bombarded. Volition, hence, has its fundamental basis in the changing factors of the social environment. Volition provides not only for individual growth, but also for the social advancement of mankind.

PROBLEMS

(INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS)

1. What is an instinct?
2. What is the origin of instincts?
3. Give the most striking example of purely instinctive action that has come to your attention.

4. Why are instincts common to people of every race?

5. Why can instincts never be eradicated from the mental constitution of the individual?

6. Distinguish between "social instincts" and "individual instincts."

7. What social instincts can you name?

8. Give three illustrations of the statement: Social institutions rest upon the basis of instincts.

(HABITUAL REACTIONS)

9. Criticize: He instinctively closed the door after he entered the room.

10. What is the origin of habits?

11. What is the underlying purpose of habits?

12. What is the derivation of the term, habit?

13. Explain: The process of building up new habits is the method by which the individual grows.

14. Explain: The process of building up new habits is the method by which society progresses.

15. Illustrate: One's strength of character is due to habit.

16. Illustrate: Habit is a time-saver.

17. Illustrate: Habit increases accuracy.

18. Illustrate: Habit gives a permanency to experience.

19. Explain: "Habit is the bank into which consciousness puts its deposits."

20. Explain: Speed which is habitual is never hurried.

21. Explain: The population of London would be starved in a week if the flywheel of habit were removed.

22. Is it true that whatever is worth doing at all, is worth doing well? Why?

23. What is the habit of greatest usefulness that one can form?

24. How would you go about it, psychologically, to break a habit?

25. What class of habits are the most difficult to break?

26. What is meant by a "social habit"?

27. Which would represent a greater loss to the individual, the loss of his habits, or the loss of his instincts?

28. Which will be used in the following cases, instinct or habit?

(a) By an untrained puppy when his mistress appears with a plate of scraps.

(b) By a trained puppy under similar circumstances.

(c) By a salmon in a whirling current of a river.

(d) By a fireman who sees a house on fire.

(e) By a mother whose child is in imminent danger.

(CONSCIOUS REACTIONS)

General

29. When does consciousness appear in the experience of an individual?

30. Qualitatively, which is a higher art: writing or walking; thinking or writing; deciding "no" or deciding "yes"? Why, in each case?

Affective

31. Define the feelings.

32. What does a pleasant feeling signify?

33. Why are human beings remarkably the same in regard to their feelings?

34. Why is it difficult to argue against the feelings?

Cognitive

35. Why do you think?

36. Why are you thinking now?

37. When do you do the least amount of thinking?

38. When do you do the highest grade of thinking?

39. Illustrate: Cognition plays the decisive rôle in adapting the organism to its environment.

40. Does a squirrel need to be more intelligent than a fish?

41. Does an architect need to be more intelligent than a mason?

42. Does the child of the tenements need to be more intelligent than the child of wealthy parents?

43. Explain: "No two individuals can ever think alike, whilst any number can feel alike."

44. Which tends to be expressed the quicker, the feeling side or the cognitive side of consciousness? Why?

45. Define the imagining phase of cognition.

46. Explain: "The tap-root of selfishness is weakness of imagination."

47. Is the intolerant, selfish nation the unimaginative nation?

48. Of what does remembering consist?

49. Is the average person of today less able to remember than the average person of three centuries ago?

50. Give an illustration (a) of ancient feats of remembering, and (b) of present-day achievements along the same line?

51. Explain: "The average student habitually begins the study of his lessons by memorizing, with the expectation of doing whatever thinking is necessary later."

52. Is the examination system in universities sound, psychologically?

53. Can one think quickly and well at the same time?

54. What is reasoning?

55. What is the highest function of reasoning?

56. Why do so few people develop the reasoning phase of consciousness to its full extent, when it would be so greatly to their advantage to do so?

57. When do you act most rationally?

58. Are the judgments which are made by men more impartial than those made by women?

59. Can the making of sound judgments be acquired through training?

Volitional

60. Explain: (a) Thought is motor; (b) ideas are dynamic; and (c) the motor character of an idea.

61. Define volition.

62. Is it more common for a person to base his decision upon evidence, or to seek evidence to justify his decision? Illustrate both methods.

63. Bring to the class an advertisement which appeals (a) to the feelings, (b) to cognition, and (c) to volition.

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CHAPTER III.

THE SIMPLER SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

I.

The discussion in this chapter is intended to carry forward the points emphasized in Chapter II concerning the social phases of the life and activities of the individual. The instincts may be subdivided into two groups: those which are concerned directly with promoting the welfare of the individual, and those which serve to continue and to enlarge group life. In the latter class, there are innumerable overlappings, but certain tendencies stand out as being social in their significance. Of these, the gregarious, sex and parental, inquisitive, combative, acquisitive, and play instincts and tendencies will receive attention.

The gregarious instinct rests upon the satisfaction of being one of a herd or group, and the uneasiness—leading to wild distraction—of being alone, or separated from the group. The animal which becomes separated from the herd will risk its life in order to get back.

Rural people on a holiday rush to the places where the crowd is to congregate. Urban people herd together in the already overcongested districts. Prisoners subjected to solitary confinement suffer so greatly that penologists now consider this form of punishment too cruel. The gregarious instinct possesses a definite survival value in that it keeps individuals together and furnishes a basis for co-operative work. In the long process of the struggle for existence, those individuals survive best who co-operate best.

The sex and parental instincts are so closely related that they will be considered together. The sex instincts make the race possible. Without them, no large group could long survive. Their power is great and their regulation is one of the greatest of social problems. In fact, this problem has come to be known as *the social evil*.

As an outgrowth of the sex instincts, the parental impulses are to be rated highly. With the development of the parental instincts, there followed historically the rise of the institution of the family. Without parental care, the offspring early begins the struggle for existence, and has little opportunity for development. With one parent to give a protecting and directing care, the offspring has a better chance for self-development and becomes a more useful member of the group. But when both parents co-operate in the process of family-building, the children are thus given the advantage of the experience of two elders; and are pro-

tected from the harsher phases of the struggle for existence, for a time sufficient to enable them to become mature individuals, and to learn the meaning of many fundamental principles of co-operative living.

The importance of the parental instincts (and of the institution of the family) is so great that children who grow up outside of the family, rarely become real social members of society. The writer in studying the home conditions of delinquents has found that the broken-up home of one sort or another is found in the majority of delinquent cases.¹

As a member of the family, the child learns fundamental rules of social conduct. He acquires respect for law; he learns rudimentary principles of co-operation. Since the family is, in a sense, a social microcosm, the child in a normal family receives an excellent start along all lines which make for co-operation in society at large.

The parental impulses result beneficially, also, as far as the parents are concerned. The instincts lead to conduct which is essentially altruistic. The parental impulses when in operation are constantly overcoming the self-gratifying desires. There is a continuous struggle between the parental tendencies on one hand and the egoistic interests on the other. In order to protect

¹"A Study of Juvenile Delinquency and Dependency in Los Angeles County for the Year 1912," *Jour. of Crim. Law and Criminol.*, Sept., 1914, p. 395.

itself and to further the parental impulses, the group (and society) has built up powerful sanctions. The list includes moral rules, e. g., Honor thy father and thy mother. Then there is the institution of marriage which has become a guardian of the parental impulses. Taboos upon celibacy, upon divorce, upon immoral sex life are powerful agents supporting the parental instincts. Ancestor worship has emphasized the parental impulses, and thus assisted other factors in giving to China a long life. Emphasis upon sound family life has enabled, to a positive extent, the Hebrew race to perpetuate itself and to survive countless obstacles and innumerable destructive factors.

The inquisitive instinct leads to inquiry into those phenomena which are moderately different from those of regular occurrence. Events which are not different do not attract notice; events which are markedly different from anything that has been known to occur arouse fear. Animals which have been led astray by anything that is very strange have probably lost their lives. Those individuals, either animal or human, which are never attracted by anything new remain mediocre members of the group. But those who show an interest in things which are moderately strange, avoid destruction on the one hand and mediocrity on the other. Thus the curiosity impulses have taken form. Groups of reasonably curious individuals survive best.

It seems true that scientific research, and even intellectual study, as a rule, is based definitely upon the

curiosity impulse. Research work in its purest form is largely motivated by the curiosity instinct. All intellectual progress, and thus social progress, depends in a degree upon the curiosity instinct.

The combative instinct operates as a force which calls for broad-minded consideration. In a primitive group, the fighting members survived; the others perished. In primitive society, the fighting tribes succeeded best; the others were destroyed. Thus through a long period of time, the combative instinct has been at a high survival premium. It has become deep-seated in human nature.

It is accompanied by the emotion of anger. It operates when any obstacle appears in the way of the other instinctive tendencies, or of the habitual activities, or of the newly aroused and currently conscious desires. The combative instinct—including the accompanying emotion of anger—serves to energize the individual, to concentrate his energies, and to drive him ahead over the obstacles that are in the way. In its crudest forms, it shows itself in the snarl and rush of the dog, in the clenched and striking fists of the boy, in the "hanging" episodes of the mob, in the brutal atrocities which are committed in the name of organized warfare.

The fighting instinct has been undergoing modifications. While it is a heritage from the days of tooth and claw, it is, in modified terms, an essential factor in civilization. In early days it was expressed in a physical way, for example, in the physical combat. Today,

in a civilized state, individuals no longer, as a rule, resort to a physical clash in order to settle disputes, but turn to organized courts and to discussion and conciliation. Their individual fighting abilities are thus not used destructively, but are turned from physical combat to spiritual interchange of opinion. In fact, it appears that the fighting instinct may be subjected to certain intrinsic changes. Its very nature may yet be made over by the operation of intellectual phenomena, such as discussion; of social organizations, such as courts of justice; and of the highest spiritual virtues, such as love. The biological struggle in the human world as manifested in militarism and commercialism of the destructive type is probably doomed to give way ultimately before "the quiet, creative influences of the spiritual virtues," chief of which is love. The "fittest," as a class, are undergoing an evolution from the lowest types of personified physical might and power to types of mental power and efficiency, and then to rational types controlled by the social principle of love.

One of the latest indications of the turning belief in regard to the need for vital modifications of the fighting instinct comes from no other source than the University of Berlin. According to *The Nation* (January 17, 1918), Professor G. F. Nicolai of the University of Berlin published in 1917 a book entitled *Die Biologie des Krieges*.² This daring German writer

² Quoted from the *Westminster Gazette*.

(imprisoned for his views) holds that the hitherto ineradicable fighting instinct, in the modern world, is a survival of tendencies which, though at one time useful, are now positively dangerous. The need for a change in the nature of this instinct is imperative. One race of animals after another has perished because it could not change its instinctive ways; hence, is mankind to die out because it cannot change the fighting instinct? Will mankind literally kill itself off? In Chapter VI, the discussion of the psychology of war is continued under a study of group conflicts, especially of conflicts between modern states, and of the evolution in the nature of group conflicts.

Nations, however, still resort to physical combat. It is a hope and a working ambition that the time will soon come when nations can develop an international court (including an international constabulary) for settling disputes upon such effective and just bases, that they no longer must live under the continual shadow of possible war. When war becomes historic, there will still be a great need for the combative impulses. Then, nations and individuals will be called upon to fight social evils and sins. They will be constrained to fight, not the best people of competitive, sovereign groups; but the evil in all people, under a social, planetary, and international order. The struggles against social wickedness will always demand, as far as one can now see, the exercise of the fighting instinct in a modified form. Thus, the combative tendencies are not

to be eliminated, but to be directed, modified, and made subservient to world-wide welfare.

The acquisitive instinct, also, involves serious social implications. The tendency to acquire is an individualizing force, in fact, to such an extent that its operation has to be checked by public action. It lies at the basis of all acquisitions of land and other forms of material wealth. Men go on accumulating riches long after they have acquired enough property for their own needs and for the needs of their dependents. Nations have fought to acquire land. Nearly all of the extensive wars that have been waged by monarchical governments have been related to the national desire for more land. When monarchical forms of government pass away, it is probable that territorial wars will be known no longer.

A fundamental problem of the day is that of regulating, nationally, the operation of the acquisitive instinct. On one side are those who argue that these desires should be crushed out and that the government should own all rent-producing land and interest-producing capital. On the other hand, there are the people who hold that the acquisitive impulses are too deep-seated to be ruled out, that it would not be wise—if it were possible—to eliminate them, and that they should be allowed to operate, but subject to governmental regulation in line with public welfare. Their operation assumes on occasion, however, a force which defies efficient governmental control. The regulation of the

acquisitive instinct constitutes one of the most serious problems of the day in our country.

Another characteristic which is innate, instinctive, and of vast social significance is the tendency to play. It is complex enough to permit of various explanations and of markedly different classifications. It functions as a highly valuable socializing agency. As a member of the play-group, the child learns co-operative lessons of fundamental, life-long, and social importance; he learns to obey, to lead, to evaluate himself as a group-member, and to appreciate the larger meanings of teamwork.

The normal exercise of the play impulses renews life. It rehabilitates and it re-creates life; it offers relaxation, and at the same time brings the individual to a balanced attitude toward the world of living, changing, and developing people.

Further, the emphasis is being placed today upon eight hours for work, eight hours for sleep, and eight hours for recreation. The formula is not followed regularly, but it does indicate that a large portion of life is given over to amusements and recreation. The questions arise: "Does it matter how one plays?" and, "Is it anybody's business how one spends his leisure hours?" The answer is positive and affirmative from the standpoint of group welfare. It matters decidedly from the viewpoint of the group how the individual plays, whether he wastes or builds up his energies when he is not at work.

In this age, commercial enterprise has entered the field of providing amusements of all sorts and for all classes and all moods of individuals. The provision is made in ways, primarily, to secure profits, not to build up those who are seeking recreation. Hence, the type of appeals that is made to the play instincts becomes a problem of vast social moment.³

II.

Another social phase of the life of the individual is that of sympathy. As the word implies, sympathy refers to the characteristic of "feeling with" others. Sympathy helps an individual to understand the experiences, attitudes toward life, and states of mind of other people. As an example of an elemental form of sympathetic emotion, the immediate and appropriate response of the brood of chickens to the warning cry of the mother hen may be cited. The vigorous crying of a baby is followed by simultaneous crying on the part of near-by infants, even though they do not have the slightest idea as to the cause of the crying of the first child. A scream of terror on the part of an adult evokes a similar pang on the part of bystanders, even though the bystanders do not know the cause of the cry.

The characteristic of "feeling with" others varies with individuals. In an extreme form, it decreases the efficiency of the individual. In a weak degree, it

³ Bogardus, E. S., *Introduction to Sociology*, Ch. V.

results in egoistic, selfish living on the part of the individual.

When an important question is to be settled, the side which is successful in enlisting the feelings and the sympathies possesses a marked advantage. As in the case of the feelings, sympathy is not closely related to the reasoning phase of consciousness, and hence is liable to express itself in highly irrational ways. Its manifestations are usually found on the conservative side of an issue. The sympathies are generally allied with the old, the tried, and the true. They are stabilizing forces; but when they become attached to certain outworn habits, the sympathies become a stumbling-block in the way of progress. On the other hand, every new reform movement seeks to reach and to gain the sympathies of the people. If it is able thus to do, its success is assured. Sympathy has been described as a social cement, because it assists in holding the members of a group together, and in forming new groups.

The emotions as social factors represent such enlarged phases of the feeling side of the mind that they are accompanied temporarily either by a wild, blind exhibition of the volitional nature, or by an inhibition of the will power. The emotion of anger, for example, results in concentrated, but frequently irrational activity; while, on the other hand, the emotion of subjection (and dejection), which occurs in relation to defeat and vital losses, tends to paralyze all volitional effort.

Emotions arise in connection with blocked interests. Whenever an obstacle appears in the path of a human desire, a mental conflict ensues, accompanied by emotional manifestations. The emotion is, in a way, the affective phase of the conflict. When conflicts occur, the emotions arise; but when no conflicts exist, *ennui* develops. An emotion and *ennui* represent opposite ends of the pole of interest. Emotions, in other words, heighten and give color to the obstacles of life.

The sentiments are psychic forces with social meanings. A sentiment is a complex of emotional reactions which appears in organized ways. The sentiments are organized emotions with social values. Admiration, for example, involves another person, that is, the admired as well as the one who admires. It implies a certain degree of wonder, of humility, and of generosity. Admiration plus fear constitutes awe; awe with the addition of gratitude leads to reverence—the highest known religious emotional expression.⁴

Love and hate are organized emotional complexes which enter into human reactions concerning nearly every phase of life, social as well as individual. Love, like its fundamental feeling and emotional elements, is a stabilizing, conserving, and drawing force of immeasurable power. In its social expressions, it may be more or less purely sexual, and may lead to sexual

⁴ See McDougall, Wm., *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. V.

vice. A higher form is that known as romantic love, the subjects of which are impelled to extensive undertakings in behalf of the ones who are loved. Conjugal love develops out of the fact that husbands and wives experience great joys and intense sufferings together. Maternal love is the keenest, deepest, and most concentrated form of the love of one person for another, i. e., the love of a mother for her child. Consanguineal love refers to the affection of children for one another, primarily, in a given family, and of the father for his offspring. Consanguineal love may extend itself beyond blood relationships, and in its highest sense, it may assume planetary proportions and give content to a doctrine of brotherhood of man.⁵

Hate is a sentiment of anti-social import when directed blindly against people. Its social strength appears when it is hurled against social sin, rather than against people, as such. Closely related to hate is the sentiment of jealousy which often works as a narrowing influence. The individual is justified in being jealous only of that which in the long run is in line with public welfare. The list of the sentiments is long, and includes in addition to those mentioned, emotional complexes such as shame, pity, surprise, respect, and anxiety.

Character is more than organized sentiments, and more than disposition and temperament. Disposition

⁵ See Ward, L. F., *Pure Sociology*, pp. 377 ff.

refers to the sum total of one's instinctive tendencies, while temperament is more complicated and involves the constitutional ways of evaluating the various experiences of life.⁶ The disposition and temperament of the individual are largely determined for the individual by the laws of heredity. Character, however, is built upon the disposition and temperament and along lines determined to an extent by the individual himself. Character involves the extent and the way in which the individual organizes his ways of acting. Dependableness of character is a vital social attribute. In a world of group interactions, honesty, reliability, chastity, and dependableness of character are essential.

III.

The development of the self is largely a social process.⁷ To the young child, everything is at first objective. Even his fingers and toes seem to belong to the outside world. But through experience, for example, of pain and of suffering, the infant begins to give to his fingers and toes a self valuation. Through his experiences, he comes to distinguish between the ego and the alter, and to set up a self-world in apposition to an others-world. The idea of the self develops in relation to the concept of others; it is in part a reflection of

⁶ McDougall, Wm., *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 258 ff.

⁷ Baldwin, J. M., *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Ch. I, and Cooley, C. H., *Social Organization*, Chs. I, II.

other selves in a world of group relationships. The interaction between the growth of the ego and the alter in the mind of the child is constant. The process may be considered as one, and the ego and the alter as opposite ends of the same pole. The child's social consciousness arises simultaneously and to an extent prior to the development of his self-consciousness. In fact, if it were not for the presence and activities of others, his self-consciousness would remain undeveloped. The leading stimuli which call forth self-consciousness are those which come from contact with other selves.

When the child is learning the meaning of life through his experiences, he is simultaneously reading those meanings into the experiences of others. He projects himself and his experiences into the world of life about him, a stage in the development of the self which the writer would call projective. Each fact of life to the growing individual is first objective and with little meaning, then subjective and full of personal significance, and finally projective and social. The process is essentially one of social self-development.

In this connection, the looking-glass self is a term which conveys a valuable truth.⁸ The looking-glass self is the impression of oneself that he sees in the minds and estimates of others. The conduct of every person is continuously conditioned by the presence and

⁸ Cooley, C. H., *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 152 ff.

opinions of others, and especially by the judgments of his friends. The young man who, although not interested in missions, subscribes liberally to a missionary collection, because by his side sits a young lady who is active in missionary enterprises and whose favor he wishes to secure, is an example. Or, a business man may boast of a shrewd transaction to one whom he knows would approve of said shrewdness, while he may refrain from mentioning the deal to another friend whose standards are higher. At every turn of life, the choices of a person are partially determined by the image of himself which he sees in the judgments of others.

PROBLEMS

(THE SOCIAL INSTINCTS)

1. What is meant by the gregarious instinct?
2. Does the gregarious instinct exist in the hermit?
3. Why do the working classes on holidays rush to the places where the crowds are?
4. Why is the country considered dull by so many people?
5. What are the leading forces opposing the parental impulses?
6. What kind of impulses sets off the curiosity instinct?
7. Are women more curious than men?
8. What connection is there between the curiosity instinct and the scientific tendencies?

9. What instinctive tendencies impel a person to run to see a fight?

10. Is it necessary to get angry in order to fight well?

11. Do conscripted soldiers fight with the same spirit as volunteer soldiers?

12. Are the fighting impulses to be ruled out entirely, or to be directed along higher lines?

13. What methods can you suggest whereby the fighting instinct may be directed along higher paths?

14. What is meant by "righteous indignation"?

15. Is the fighting instinct necessary to social progress?

16. What has rendered unnecessary the bodily combat of individuals in order to settle disputes?

17. Most men do not want war, yet we have it; why?

18. Is the operation of the acquisitive instinct to be eliminated, or to be directed along social lines?

19. What are the social values in play?

20. Explain: A mason who is piling up brick is working, and a boy who is piling up blocks is playing.

21. Why is work hard, and play easy, to a child even when the latter requires the expenditure of more energy?

22. Why is clearing brush and weeds from a lot for a baseball diamond considered as play by a boy, while clearing the same lot at his parent's command is work?

(SYMPATHY, THE EMOTIONS, THE SENTIMENTS,
CHARACTER)

23. Why is one's sympathies toward a fellow countryman more keen in a foreign country than when one is at home?

24. Why is it not enough for a business man to be a sympathetic husband, parent, and neighbor?

25. Explain: Every citizen should indulge in a spell of capricious and sympathetic giving.

26. Is sympathy a necessary qualification for a successful social worker?

27. Distinguish between the emotions and the feelings.

28. Is anger a good guide to action?

29. Is national anger a correct guide to national action?

30. Why are children afraid of the dark?

31. Describe the physical expression of (a) a happy face, (b) a sad face, (c) an angry face; and explain the relation of the given facial expression to the given emotion.

32. How would you define the sentiment of love?

33. What is the social value of love?

34. What is the social utility of hate?

35. Define jealousy.

36. Illustrate: Character is socially essential.

(THE SOCIAL SELF, THE LOOKING-GLASS SELF)

37. Distinguish between the individual self and the social self.

38. Give an original illustration of the looking-glass self.

39. Why is it that many individuals can talk to two or three persons with ease, but cannot talk to twenty or thirty persons without embarrassment?

40. In what ways does the looking-glass self of a student affect his recitation in a class?

41. How far should one allow his looking-glass self to determine his character?

42. Who are the more sensitive to the looking-glass self, men or women?

43. What causes a little boy to become ashamed of his curls?

44. Are the wealthy or the poor more sensitive to the looking-glass self?

45. Which is the greater factor in arousing the desire of a girl "to make a sorority", the gregarious instinct, or the looking-glass self?

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CHAPTER IV.

THE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

(Continued)

IV.

Language is a social product. It arises on the basis of the need for intercommunication; it involves a symbol and a meaning for the symbol. The significance of the symbol must be clear to the individual with whom communication is held. The symbol is always a gesture of some sort, either pantomimic (of the hands and shoulders), or mimetic (of the face), or vocal. In every case, the gesture represents the beginning of a whole act. As soon as the second party recognizes the whole act of which the given gesture is the beginning, conversation has begun. The response will consist of another gesture—the beginning of another act—and thus the conversation of attitudes and appropriate responses will continue. Hence, language is a social phenomenon, and consists in an interchange of gestures and suitable responses between individuals—a theory of

language which has been described best by Professor G. H. Mead.¹

V.

At first thought, the subject of laughter does not seem to be of a nature serious enough for scientific discussion. It, however, is a phenomenon which manifests itself constantly in daily life. In a physiological sense, it may express simple relief from strained situations, as in the case of school children who, when released from hours of study and recitation, start homeward in a laughing mood. It may represent mere exuberance and joy in living, as seen frequently on the part of children. Or, the nervous reaction from overstrain of any sort may culminate in hysterical laughter.

In a psychological sense, laughter involves frequently the expression of sympathetic emotion. As a member of a group, one laughs more easily than when alone. Furthermore, much laughter is caused by the expression of unusual ideas, such as logical inconsistencies, ungrammatical constructions, statements involving a sudden change "from the sublime to the ridiculous," suggestion not intended, the pun, and moderate exaggeration or understatement.

Laughter is due, also, to causes that are directly social. Much laughter arises directly from observing the incongruous actions of others. The Charlie Chap-

¹ "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," *Psychological Bul.*, VII: 397-405.

lin films succeed because of the portrayal of incongruous motions, actions, and situations. Further, there is the laughter of the person who laughs in order not to be conspicuous, of the person who laughs to cover his embarrassment, and of him who laughs in order to make others laugh, e. g., the professional actor. Then there is social ridicule. The group laughs at the mistake or idiosyncrasy of the individual. This group laughter may be either (a) spontaneous, (b) delayed, or (c) concerted. The last type involves maliciousness. Every markedly new idea must run the gauntlet of social laughter.

There is some overlapping and some unsurveyed territory in the accompanying classification of the causes of laughter. It will be observed that the writer accepts neither the single theory explanations of laughter, such as those of Aristotle, Kant, Schopenhauer, or Sully, nor the analysis *in toto* as made by Sidis, but prefers a two-fold classification based upon (1) physiological and (2) psycho-sociological elements, and including parts of the analyses by Sidis and others.

CAUSES OF LAUGHTER.

A. Physiological.

1. Tickling.
2. Relief.
3. Exuberance.
4. Hysteria.

B. Psycho-sociological.

1. Unusual ideas.

(1) Logical inconsistency.

(2) Grammatical error.

(3) Sublime to the ridiculous.

(4) Suggestion not intended.

(5) The pun.

(6) Moderate overstatement or understatement.

2. Group contagion.

3. Incongruous actions of others.

4. In order not to be conspicuous.

5. To cover embarrassment.

6. To make others laugh (professional).

7. To make fun of others (social ridicule).

(1) Spontaneous.

(2) Reflective.

(3) Concerted.

VI.

Suggestion and imitation are here considered as different phases of the same process. Suggestion is the initiating part and imitation is the responding phase of the phenomenon.

Suggestion develops out of the motor character of ideas, or from the dynamic nature of thought. If some one merely mentions apple pie, even between meals, I am quite certain to feel hungry for apple pie. If some

one casually refers to a baseball game that is in progress while I am writing these lines, I may find myself unconsciously laying aside the pen and looking for my cap. Further, I will go to the game, if there are no seriously inhibiting impulses, either instinctive, habitual, or conscious. Suggestion, then, refers to the conscious or unconscious intrusion to the mind of an idea which is accepted uncritically and carried out more or less immediately, unless inhibited by opposing impulses. This definition differs from that of Sidis² who holds that the suggested idea meets at first with more or less opposition.

Suggestion may be direct or indirect. If direct, it comes usually in the form of a command, from one who is older and whose word is accepted as authority. The child in responding to parental command illustrates direct suggestion; a hypnotist in giving his orders is another example, for the subject responds within instinctive and organized limits in an uncritical and immediate way to the suggested action. Hypnotism is characterized by abnormal suggestibility, and as a phenomenon for study, comes within the purview of abnormal psychology, rather than of social psychology. As a social phenomenon, hypnotism is as yet too little understood to be of much social value.

Indirect suggestion operates unrecognized by the subject. It has been described by Professor E. A. Ross

² *The Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 15.

as "slantwise" suggestion and as representing a flank movement, rather than a frontal attack, as in the case of direct suggestion. The adult mind is frequently more easily influenced by this method than by any other plan.

The use of the terms direct and indirect suggestion has reference to the way in which the suggestion gains entrance to the mind. Another set of terms, namely, immediate, mediate, and contra-suggestion, has been used by Mr. Sidis and indicates the ways in which suggestions are carried out in action. If a suggested idea is acted upon at once and in line with its impulses, the phenomenon comes under the caption of immediate suggestion. If time elapses and modifications occur, the type is called mediate suggestion. Some persons and many children respond in an opposite way to that which is suggested, and illustrate the principle of contra-suggestion. The last mentioned form is usually connected with an exaggerated sense of individuality, and with an inadequate opportunity to learn the lessons of give-and-take in play groups.

Suggestibility refers to the degree to which a person is open to suggestion. Normal suggestibility involves fixation of attention, elimination of inhibitory impulses, and immediate consummation.

All minds are suggestible, but in varying degrees. The variations in suggestibility of an individual have been carefully discussed by Mr. McDougall and Professor Ross. Their analyses have been co-ordi-

nated in the following statement. Suggestibility varies: (a) with the age of the individual, (b) with temperament, (c) with sex, (d) with the degree of fatigue and illness, (e) with the amount of organized facts concerning the suggested idea, (f) with the extent of prestige or authority which centers about the person who gives the suggestion, and (g) with the degree of crowd or group emotion that prevails.

VII.

What has been said of suggestion, applies also to imitation, the motor part of the same process. Some so-called imitation is nothing more than a phase of communication. The small boy who clenches his fist when he faces the clenched fist of another boy, is not imitating the act of the second youth, but is simply making an appropriate response. The suitable response which is called forth happens to resemble the combative attitude, but is not an imitation thereof.

Imitation may be either conscious or unconscious. These two types have been considered in the paragraphs upon direct and indirect suggestion. Direct suggestion usually leads to more or less conscious imitation, while indirect suggestion finds expression through unconscious imitation.

Imitation is always accompanied by invention.³ Nothing is imitated exactly according to copy, because

³ Baldwin, J. M., *The Individual and Society*, p. 149.

of the personal equation of the imitator. In imitating, a person will vary somewhat from the copy, even if the process is unconscious. It may be said that even so-called pure invention consists in modifying copies. In invention, the imitation and modification of the old is a larger element than the creation of something entirely new. The inventions of Mr. Thomas A. Edison, for example, are based upon past discoveries. Every imitator is at the same time an inventor, and every inventor is also an imitator. Inventions will receive further attention in a subsequent chapter.

Imitation is primarily a conserving factor in society. It secures the continuation of established ways of doing, and also, of new methods. Imitation is a leading phase of the educational process, by which knowledge is passed on from generation to generation.

Imitation assumes two forms of social expression: (a) custom imitation, which has reference to the imitation of past ways of doing; and (b) contemporary imitation, which involves the copying of current ideas and actions. Contemporary imitation may be either non-competitive, or competitive. The former class is closely akin in its operation to custom imitation; the latter form, known as fashion imitation, manifests special characteristics, such as the imitation of the new and the novel, under special group conditions.

Rational, or merit imitation, includes those cases of custom imitation and fashion imitation which are reasonable under the attendant conditions. Many customs,

but only a small percentage of fashions, will pass the test of serviceability. Rational imitation, as well as the larger fields of custom and fashion imitation, will constitute the central themes of the next chapter.

PROBLEMS

(LANGUAGE)

1. What is meant by the social origin of language?
2. Illustrate the various forms of language, (a) mimetic, (b) pantomimic, and (c) vocal.
3. Explain: A gesture is a syncopated act.

(LAUGHTER)

4. Is laughter a topic important enough for serious discussion? Why?
5. Is it worth while to develop the habit of seeing the humorous side of life?
6. Why do people laugh?
7. What are the physical expressions of a hearty laugh?
8. What is Shakespeare's meaning when he speaks of being "stabbed" with laughter?
9. What does Milton mean when he writes of "laughter holding both his sides"?
10. What are the earliest causes of laughter in the child?
11. Why do we laugh at incongruous or degrading experiences of others? Why should we not feel grieved?

12. Why does a group of school children released from the class room burst forth into boisterous laughter?

13. What are the psychological effects of a good laugh?

14. Why is a city dude in the country a mirth-producing object?

15. Why is a "hayseed" in the city the subject of laughter?

16. Is man more afraid of social ridicule than of actual severe punishment?

17. Explain: "Laughter can kill innovations."

18. Explain: "The true hero is one who can ignore social laughter."

19. Why do people laugh at stories involving stuttering?

20. Why is the walking of a drunken man considered laughable by many persons?

21. Why does a wry face (without pain) cause the spectator to laugh?

22. What is the cause of laughter on the part of the onlooker in the following cases: (a) The entrance of a dog into a lecture room filled with students; (b) The waves dashing unexpectedly over a person who is walking on the beach; (c) A person falling upstairs; (d) The comic sheet; (e) A chair that breaks down during a lecture; (f) A trivial interruption that occurs during a prayer service.

23. What is the most common cause of laughter?

24. Why are deaf people, and not blind people, used in comedies?

25. Distinguish between humor, comedy, and wit.

26. What is the leading social value in laughter?

(SUGGESTION)

27. Is every normal mind suggestible?

28. What is the relation of the motor character of ideas to suggestibility?

29. What rule may one follow in driving a nail in order to avoid hitting his thumb?

30. What is meant by "muscle reading"?

31. Explain: Your throat will ache "after listening to a speaker who forms his voice badly."

32. What is the difference between impulses and suggestions?

33. Distinguish between direct and indirect suggestion by the use of original illustrations.

34. Illustrate slantwise suggestion.

35. What is the suggestion involved in the politician's slogan: "Pass prosperity around"?

36. What difference does it make whether clerks ask, "Shall we send the package?" or, "Shall we send the package, or will you take it with you?"

37. Which is the better sign: "Keep off the Grass," or "Why not keep on the Sidewalk"?

38. How does the following sign affect you: "Ladies and Gentlemen will not pull the Flowers; others must not."

39. Find in Shakespeare an illustration of indirect suggestion.

40. How do you explain "the deadliness of the innuendo"?

41. Why is faint praise more damaging than downright depreciation?

42. Why is it true that sometimes the best way to get the offer of a coveted position is not to seem anxious for it?

43. Is a person suggestible when asleep?

44. Give an original illustration of auto-suggestion.

45. Illustrate how suggestibility varies according (a) to species, (b) to prestige, (c) to fatigue, and (d) to races.

46. Why are the French or the Italians more subject to suggestion than the English or the Germans?

47. Are women more suggestible than men?

48. Is an under-fed person more suggestible than a well-fed person?

49. Account for the moral influence of certain teachers and the lack thereof of others, equally well-intentioned.

50. What is the danger in talks "on sex hygiene before the segregated pupils of the public schools"?

51. Is it safer "on meeting a formidable animal to stand than to run"?

52. Explain the suggestion in the statement "He doth protest too much."

53. Distinguish between normal and abnormal suggestibility.

54. When is a person most suggestible?

55. When is one least suggestible?

(IMITATION)

56. Give an original illustration of imitation.

57. Distinguish between conscious and unconscious imitation by the use of illustrations.

58. Illustrate: Imitation is a conserving factor in society.

59. Explain: Imitation is a vital factor in social progress.

60. Explain: "Everybody in the same village walks on an average at the same rate of speed."

61. Illustrate: "We are most imitative in the things not the object of conscious attention."

62. Is "sentiment more electric than opinion"?

63. Is an ideal a better religious nucleus than a dogma?

64. Why is the moral responsibility of the novelist great?

65. Who is the more dangerous to society, the disseminator of wrong ideals, or of wrong opinions?

66. Should there be censorship of motion pictures?

67. Does art need censorship more than science?

68. Explain: "The vortical suction of our civilization is stronger than ever before."

69. Explain psychologically: Nothing succeeds like success.

70. Whom does a child imitate the more, other children, or adults?

71. Which is the more subject to imitation, (a) indolence or ambition; (b) saving or spending?

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CHAPTER V.

THE SOCIAL OPERATION OF IMITATION

I.

Individuals imitate their contemporaries; they also copy their predecessors. In either case, imitation may be conscious, or it may be unconscious, on the part of the individual. In either instance, the individual may imitate blindly, and hence in an irrational way, or he may imitate in a highly rational manner.

Contemporary imitation is either competitive or non-competitive; if it is of the latter type, it possesses psychological characteristics similar to those of custom imitation, which will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs in this chapter. But contemporary imitation is often competitive, in which case it is known as fashion imitation.

Fashion imitation rests fundamentally upon at least five elemental factors: First, there is the imitation process itself, through which fashions become current. By the imitation of the example of others, the individual is led upon the road that others are traveling; his interest

in social adaptation is satisfied; and union with others of his class is established.¹

In the second place, fashion gratifies the opposite desire for self-individualization and for differentiation, the desire to give oneself an individual stamp, and the desire for variation, contrast, and the new, through "a constant change of contents." No one wishes to be considered mediocre, or, everyone desires to be at least a little different from the mass, and to be credited with some degree of individuality. Fashion not only gives one a feeling of unity with his own group, but it also sets one off from other groups; it not only unites but it also separates; it settles at one and the same time the demand for unity and for segregation; it meets simultaneously the needs of class unity and of individual distinction.

A third element is that of novelty. In those countries, of course, where customs are almost literally worshipped and custom imitation rules, the new and the novel gain prestige with difficulty. But where fashion imitation has once gained standing, then the prestige of the novel assumes large proportions. The importance attached to novelty rises concomitantly with the development of fashion imitation itself; one movement accelerates the other.

Reputability is a fourth factor. The current knowledge that people are imitating a new style, or are ready

¹ Simmel, G., "Fashion," *International Quarterly*, X: 133 ff; see also Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, pp. 244 ff., and Ross, *Social Psychology*, Ch. VI,

and waiting to do so, gives the new style a full-fledged start. The fact that one's acquaintances have endorsed or adapted a new idea implies that this idea must have worth. When a petition is presented for my signature, I will sign more readily if the names of my friends are already attached. The larger the number of such names upon the list, the more reputable does the enterprise seem, and the more readily do I add my name. The implications, however, may be entirely unfounded.

In the fifth place, the activity of commercial designers and promoters furthers fashion imitation. There are people whose business is that of creating new styles which they think will please the pace-setters and the fashion clientele; before a given style has been adopted, other styles are being designed. Then there are the promoters and the advertisers (and the "fashion shows") who create an atmosphere of expectancy and of favorable anticipation.

Fashion imitation applies to all forms of activities; items of wearing apparel are simply outstanding illustrations. There is imitation—especially in the United States—of every new way of thinking or of acting. The variety of things which gives way to the caprice of fashion is without limit. A striking expression of any new idea will result in the gathering together of a number of people, in the formation of an organization, and in the promulgation of propaganda.

In our American "hustle" civilization, fashion imitation often partakes of the form of what Professor Ross

has called social racing. Someone sets the pace with reference to a new style, others immediately follow suit, and still others do likewise. As soon as the fashion becomes somewhat extensively adopted, the originators of it, or the pace-setters, devise a new style, perhaps definitely modifying the initial idea, or perhaps going to an opposite extreme. They set the pace in a new direction, and immediately the preceding style is dropped and the new trail is taken up. In this way, fashion imitation acquires a faster and faster pace. The horde of imitators try to catch up with the pace-setters, while the latter speed themselves up in trying to "sidestep" the pursuing multitude.

Gabriel Tarde was the first to develop the underlying law of fashion imitation in the statement that the superior are imitated by the inferior.² The superior in wealth set the pace in matters pertaining to the consumption of goods. Society women are the idols of débutantes and of "sub-debs." Famous preachers are imitated by the would-be renowned orators. Charlie Chaplin has his clientele of ambitious public entertainers. City people are copied by rural folk. The college upper-classmen set the pace for the lower classmen.

The craze and fad are concentrated exhibitions of fashion imitation. The craze is characterized by a

²*The Laws of Imitation*, pp. 213 ff.

large amount of excitement. Under such a spell, people will temporarily adopt almost any wildcat scheme. If the necessary excitement can be created, the result in terms of imitation can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy.

The fad, on the other hand, is a closely related phenomenon which arises in connection with novelty, rather than with excitement. Something conspicuously new appears, and because of the prestige accorded to novelty, a large number of people adopt the innovation, without giving thought to its merit. Almost any fashion, based on novelty, and suddenly adopted to an extreme extent will serve as an example of fad.

There are evidences which show that fashions are changing more rapidly than ever. The pace, in certain quarters, is increasing, due to improved methods of communication, the development of a "hustle" civilization as a moving basis, and the rise of inexpensive methods of making imitations of all sorts.

On the other hand, the opposition to the tyranny of fashion is gaining ground. Not only is there an increasing number of independent voters in this country, but there are likewise growing groups of independent thinkers with reference to fashion changes. There are increasing numbers of individuals who place worth of character above willingness to become slaves to fashion imitation.

Fashion, however, serves to accelerate progress. Every invention runs the gauntlet of fashion imita-

tion. If it has worth, as a few fashions do, it becomes adopted universally and permanently, or, until a better invention in that field is made. It then passes over from the classification of the fashionable to that of the universal.

II.

Custom imitation is especially common in the years of childhood and adolescence, although it operates, of course, throughout life. Even after one reaches maturity, he does things in a customary way without often asking why. The fact that a way of doing has been followed successfully in the past implies present usefulness. But utility in the past is not in all cases a guarantee of present-day serviceableness, because conditions and needs may have changed. Hence, even customs of high standing should be tested occasionally by current needs.

A written constitution, for example, may be excellent for its day, but a hindrance in some particulars in a later period when new needs—calling for new rules, or direct modification of old rules—have appeared. Individuals have established endowments by will for worthy purposes; but changes have ensued and the endowment legacy no longer meets real needs, but cannot be changed if in the meantime the giver has become deceased. Endowments for teaching children to card, spin, and knit were worthy at the time, but when inventions were made and the occupations

of children were changed, the endowment lost its serviceability.

It may be asserted that there is a normal tendency for a crust of custom to form over the psychic life of every group. There is a continuous carrying forward of past ways of acting. The group, thus, has to safeguard itself against stagnation by encouraging a certain amount of inquiry and of questioning in regard to customary activities. If this protective measure is not continuously emphasized, dynamic forces within the group will well up until a revolutionary break is made at some point through the enveloping crust of custom. Revolutions of serious nature may follow; new ideas may thus gain group recognition and adoption. This has been a common method of group progress, but one which has been exceedingly costly in terms of human suffering and bloodshed.

Under a régime of custom imitation, the leaders are usually elderly men,—at least they are men who have stood “pat” with reference to methods that have grown hoary with prestige. Under the sway of fashion imitation, the leaders include a great many men who are not yet in their prime, who are still climbing, and who are willing to try new ways of doing.

In physically isolated sections of the earth, custom imitation governs. Likewise in the socially isolated divisions of society, custom imitation rules. In both sets of circumstances contact with and stimulation from the new is lacking. Also, in the socially iso-

lated sections of the individual's own life, custom imitation predominates. In matters of feeling, custom imitation lives long. New ideas, in other words, do not readily affect the feeling side of life. Where custom imitation is strong, new ideas must appear in the garb of the old; where fashion imitation operates, old ideas try to appear new.

Custom imitation is non-competitive in the same sense that a certain proportion of contemporary imitation is non-competitive. This latter field has been analyzed at length by Professor Ross under the title of conventionality.³ Imitation of the conventional is marked by a type of more deliberate imitation—although uncritical for the most part—than custom imitation. Otherwise, its nature is psychically similar to imitation of customary ways of doing. The impulse which leads a person to imitate customs more or less blindly impels him to adopt without much analysis the conventional standards. Conventionality shares, however, the field of contemporary imitation with fashion. It is related in the chronological sense to fashion imitation, but in psychic similarities somewhat directly to custom imitation.

III.

Rational, or merit imitation, includes phases of both customary and fashionable activity. Since customs are

³ *Social Psychology*, Chs. VII-XI.

ways of doing which have stood the test of years, and since human needs change slowly, customs are, as a rule, meritorious. To the degree that customs are adopted, not blindly, but on the ground of serviceability, the process is rational. A large portion of custom imitation is rational—but not always deliberately so—on the part of the individual. This generalization applies, but in a much less degree, to conventionality imitation; and only in a minority of cases, to fashion imitation.

Because fashion imitation rests its case so largely upon novelty and reputability, it signifies irrational activities. Only to a small degree is fashion imitation worthy of commendation. Of a hundred new fashions chosen at random, less than ten per cent can stand the test of genuine merit.

Rational imitation includes a rather large percentage of custom imitation and a small proportion of fashion imitation. Customs must be submitted continuously to present-day tests, or else they will block social progress. Fashions likewise need to be tested and criticized severely, or they will entail tremendous social losses and dissipations.

A small but vital and growing phase of rational imitation is socio-rational imitation; this implies the application not only of standards of merit, but also of tests involved in the term human welfare. Rationality and efficiency, but not necessarily socio-rational tests, are applied in the business world. Strength of char-

acter and efficiency are terms which connote rational methods of living and of working, but they may both be used in highly destructive and disastrous ways to society; strength of character and efficiency are not adequate standards. Socio-rational imitation adds the test of social welfare to that of psychological efficiency. If the latter standard is justified psychologically, the other test has equally strong support sociologically. The two types of tests must be fused and the hyphen removed from the term which has been used in this paragraph to represent them. A socio-rational way of imitating is the most valuable method of imitation known to social psychology.

Certain sections of life, both societary and individual, fall under the control of custom,—as in matters of language and religion, and in those fields where the feelings operate powerfully. Other phases of group life and of the individual's life are subject to the capricious tyranny of fashion, e. g., questions of dress, amusement, and social conduct—these are externals in which are concerned no “really vital motives of human action.” Other portions of life—both group and individual—are under the rigid control of rational standards, e. g., the methods for attaining business success. In still other ways, all groups and individuals respond sometimes to the highest type of rational imitation, namely, that which adds sociality to rationality. Such a standard has been expressed in the principle that “the world must be made safe for democracy.”

PROBLEMS

(FASHION IMITATION)

1. Distinguish between contemporary and custom imitation.

2. Distinguish between the competitive and non-competitive forms of contemporary imitation.

3. Explain: "The telegraph and cash register are universal but not fashionable."

4. Define (a) fashion, (b) a "style."

5. Distinguish between fashion changes and progress.

6. Why has Paris been the center from which new fashions have emanated?

7. Explain: "Nothing is fashionable till it be deformed."

8. How do you account for the fact that fashions tend to the extreme?

9. Explain: "Fashion is based on novelty."

10. Explain: "Fashion is based on reputability."

11. Illustrate how fashion is based in part on the desire for self-individualization.

12. Explain and illustrate: The fashion process has two movements: (a) imitation and (b) differentiation.

13. Do you see any connection between fashion imitation and the term, "social racing"?

14. Do fashions change more rapidly than formerly?

15. Would you say that fashion imitation refines or debases one's tastes?

16. Why is the high gloss of a gentleman's high hat considered more beautiful than "a similarly high gloss on a thread-bare sleeve"?

17. Why is a given fashion often considered beautiful when in style, and unsightly when out of style?

18. Are things beautiful in proportion as they are costly?

19. Who are the more subject to present-day fashion changes, persons guided chiefly by their feelings, or by their reason? Why?

20. "Who are more responsible for fashion absurdities, the women who wear them or the men who are pleased by them?"

21. To whom are the "fashion shows" the greater benefit, the merchant, or the customers?

22. How would you explain the fact that there is less rivalry in consumption of goods "among farmers than among people of corresponding means in the city"?

23. Why is it easier to save money in the country than in the city?

24. Is it true that the standard of living rises so rapidly with every increase in prosperity "that there is scarcely any let-up in the economic strain"?

25. What is a craze? Illustrate.

26. Who are more susceptible to craze, "a hopeful, prosperous people," or "a hopeless, miserable people"?

27. Is a dynamic society more craze-ridden than one which moves along the lines of custom?

28. What is a fad? Illustrate.

29. Make a list of the five leading fads in your community at the present time.

(CUSTOM IMITATION)

30. Give an illustration of the persistence of a custom.

31. Illustrate: Physical isolation favors the sway of custom.

32. Illustrate: Social isolation favors customs.

33. Why is a custom so powerful in matters of feeling?

34. Why has the dress suit for men remained more or less the same the world over?

35. Why may a man wear the same dress suit for years, whereas a woman must have a new dress for almost every formal occasion?

36. What survivals (no longer useful) do you see in the quaintly cut dress coat?

37. Why are generals retired at about sixty-two years of age?

38. Why are popes and judges generally appointed when past middle age?

39. Do you agree: "The law library is the laboratory of the law student"?

40. Why is the display of good manners a custom among the leisure classes?

41. What are the good phases of the caste system?

42. Is it possible for a federal constitution, no matter how well adapted to conditions when written, to become in time an incubus?

43. Illustrate: "Almost everywhere propriety and conventionality press more mercilessly on woman than on man, thereby lessening her range of choice and dwarfing her will."

44. Explain: "Such generally admired beauties of person or costume as the bandaged foot, the high heel, the wasp waist, the full skirt, and the long train are such as incapacitate from all useful work."

45. Whence did the idea arise that "manual labor is degrading"?

46. Why do so many people believe that pecuniary success is the only success?

47. From what countries has the United States inherited its customs?

48. Can you name any customs which have developed in this country?

49. Why are people in old countries more interested in culture than people in new?

50. Does the study of languages tend to develop the habit of conformity to custom?

51. How does the mastery of the classics affect one's social stability?

52. Why should the foundations of true culture be laid in the classics?

53. How does the ownership of property affect one's social stability?

54. Is "the proverbial individualism of the farmer" the same as individuality?

55. Explain: "Majorities do not necessarily stand for truth and justice. They stand for the customs and convictions of the past."

56. Why are we blind to the extent of our indebtedness to society and "therefore apt to imagine our individuality much more pronounced than it actually is"?

57. Explain: Manners get worse as one travels from East to West,—they are best in Asia, fairly good in Europe, bad in America.

58. Explain: "The neophobia of the old."

(RATIONAL IMITATION)

59. What is meant by rational imitation?

60. Mention a custom that is rational; also, a fashion that is rational.

61. Is it irrational to follow authority?

62. Indicate a rational way "of ascertaining woman's sphere."

63. What are the most difficult foes of new, rational ideas and methods?

64. Which develops a more open, rational mind, the laboratory method, or the text-book method?

65. Is it rational for a religious leader to require his followers "to renounce the extravagancies of fashion and to dress simply"?

66. How does the study of hygiene, psychology, and sociology help one to become crank-proof?

67. Why do American women criticize Chinese women for compressing their feet longitudinally when they themselves try "to escape the stigma of having normal feet" by "a formidable degree of lateral compression"?

68. Why do we ridicule the customs and fashions of other people while we remain oblivious to the weaknesses of our own customs and fashions?

69. What effect does knowledge of the customs and beliefs of other peoples have upon your own customs and beliefs?

70. Does one's manner of living, or manner of work change the more rapidly? Why?

71. If you were trying to induce "Jews and Christians, Orangemen and Catholics, Germans and Slavs, Poles and Lithuanians" to sink their enmities, how would you proceed?

72. Who has the wider outlook and the freer mind, the average teacher, or the average parent?

73. In what sense is rational imitation radical? In what way is it conservative?

74. In what sections of our lives does (a) custom imitation, (b) fashion imitation, and (c) rational imitation prevail?

75. Illustrate: "One of the greatest pains to human nature is the pain of a new idea."

76. Explain: "Most of us jump into our beliefs with both feet and stand there."

77. If everybody should become a rational imitator, would progress cease because of the lack of people to try out strange and peculiar ideas?

78. Why in this civilized country do so many fashions lack utility?

79. If you had made an invention and wanted financial support, to whom would you apply: a wealthy farmer, a rich merchant, or a well-to-do educator?

80. Does education always imply rational imitation?

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CHAPTER VI.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE GROUP

I.

Human groups may be classified as permanent and temporary. Permanent groups include the family, the play group, the neighborhood group, the school group, the occupational group, the employees' and the employers' groups, the fraternal, the political, the religious groups, the racial and the sex groups, and the planetary group. These groups suffer change, but maintain their general form from year to year, and in the case of nearly all of them, from decade to decade, or for long periods.

Permanent groups have arisen out of temporary groupings; the relationship is filial. The order of development is somewhat as follows: first, human needs, then a temporary grouping to meet those needs, finally, the evolution of a permanent group or social organization. Out of countless temporary groupings, a few permanent types have attained historical prominence; but continuously subject to change and to the laws of social evolution.

For example, the family has developed in response to the needs of race continuance; it has gone through the metronymic and patronymic stages and is now in a transitional period, out of which equality of sex authority in the family relation is attaining prominence; it has run the gauntlet of polyandry, polygyny, and other forms of marriage, and has achieved a worthy degree of usefulness through monogamy.

Or, the psychology of occupations shows an evolution of the following order: human needs, crude ways of meeting these needs, the invention of methods and tools, the rise of specialization, the conscious, unconscious, or accidental gravitating of certain individuals into the given occupational group, the appearance of a definite occupational or caste consciousness, and the establishment of an occupational ethics and of occupational associations.

From another angle, permanent groups may be subdivided into sects, castes, classes, and states,—a classification which has been outlined at length, by such Continental writers as Tarde¹ and Sighele.² The group in the sense of a sect (*la secte*) is composed of individuals who differ markedly, but who are united by a common ideal and faith; of this type are religious denominations, political parties, and scientific organizations.

¹*L'opinion et la foule*, pp. 177 ff.

²*Psychologie des sectes*, pp. 45 ff.

The caste is based upon identity of profession; it is the most compact of all social organizations. After one has entered a profession and has become established therein, he has become a member of an existing caste and is more or less under its *esprit de corps*. For concrete and tangible illustrations, witness the public attitude toward the man who essays to change from the ministry to a business career, from the law to brick-laying, or from teaching to dairying.

The class possesses a psychological bond in a unity of interests. The class is less precise in its limits, but more "formidably belligerent in its attitude than the caste." In this connection, consider the outstanding class distinctions of the day, such as the laboring and capitalistic classes, with their bickerings, strifes, intrigues, and underlying hatred.

States are the most extensive group organizations yet evolved; they rest logically upon common bonds of language, national values, and national prestige. In the closing sections of this chapter, the rise of group values, of a national consciousness, and of national and international patriotism will be outlined.

From the genetic point of view, a third classification of permanent grouping is possible. There are instinctive and purposive societies. The best illustration of purely instinctive grouping is found among animals, e. g., insect societies. The primitive horde and the family are less instinctive than an insect society, but show a few signs of conscious purpose. The modern

state with its constituent groups such as political parties, economic corporations, or philanthropic societies is purposive in character; educational associations are strikingly telic. But purposive grouping in its purest sense is still in an incipient stage of development; it always and consciously aims, not simply to benefit the given group, but to advance the interests of society. Permanent groups, thus, include the purely instinctive groups at the lowest extremity of the social scale, the transitional types between, and the purely telic groups at the highest points of civilized development.

II.

Temporary groups are represented by the crowd, the mob, the assembly, and the public (a quasi-temporary group). The crowd is the most frequently mentioned form of temporary grouping.

Some crowds are heterogeneous, i. e., are composed of persons who at the given time have various and conflicting purposes. A crowd of persons at a busy street corner is a heterogeneous group, i. e., its members have varied purposes and are going in different directions. But the real crowd is homogeneous; its members at the time have a common purpose. Further, each individual is aware that the other members are moved by the same purpose as is he.

The homogeneous crowd always has a leader, but if perchance it is without a guide, it selects one. The members suffer a lessened sense of individual respon-

sibility, because responsibility is distributed and shared by all. Anonymity tends to prevail. Excitement may reign; feelings may rise; and rational processes of thought may be blocked. The members experience a heightened state of suggestibility. People are likely to act less rationally while under the crowd influence than when away from it; feelings, rather than reason, secure control. The crowd is said to be recidivistic; the members revert to lower standards of action than under ordinary influences.

Freedom of speech is rarely tolerated by a crowd; the crowd hoots down any one who attacks its follies. A crowd of financiers would not listen to the harangue of an I. W. W. leader; neither would a crowd of I. W. W. adherents sit quietly under the lashings of a capitalist.

A decision which is made entirely under the influence of the crowd has a hard struggle before it. Such decisions must usually be followed up with personal, steady, and sincere attention on the part of interested people.

On the other hand, the crowd serves many useful purposes. Time, expense, and energy are saved in unifying people by getting them together in a crowd and by addressing them as a unit, rather than as separate individuals scattered over a large territory. More enthusiasm for a given project can be created in a crowd than by any other method. Crowd conditions function oftentimes in dragging people out of selfish,

individual habits into an open avowal of group aims, into financial support of group movements, and into active group participation. The crowd arouses individuals from lethargy; it gives them new desires; it develops in them new enthusiasm; it unites them in behalf of common purposes.

The mob is a homogeneous crowd in an unusually high state of suggestibility. It is a crowd that has become frantic, and which has lost its reason. It is frequently a crowd which is committing a crime. It is a relic of barbarism and does not have a place in a civilized state.

An assembly is a group of people harnessed by cultural habits, including a set of parliamentary rules of order. These rules of order, according to Professor Ross, serve as a straightjacket upon a monster which is in constant danger of breaking loose. Rules of order function in keeping the feelings down and the reason in charge. Personalities are taboo, the chair must always be addressed, the voting must be by aye and nay, and order must be observed. An assembly is a group of people, in which ideas, rather than feelings are struggling with one another for supremacy.

The public is a communicating group with marked permanency and is to be sharply distinguished from a face-to-face group. The communicating group is made possible by the development of the printing press, the railroad, the telegraph, and the telephone. The press has been credited by Sighele with having created the

public and having substituted it for the crowd.⁴ The same author also recognizes the part that the railroad and the telegraph play in developing a public. The railroad has shortened distances, and newspapers thus reach remote places in a comparatively short time; the telegraph has almost eliminated distance, because thereby any news whatever can travel over thousands of miles in a few minutes. Hence the railroad and the telegraph give wings to the press and the feeling of actuality to a public.⁵

Each reading public tends to develop its own type of journalism; tends to produce newspapers which have its own good and bad qualities, and which are its own creations.⁶ Large numbers of people, spread over a large territory, read regularly the organs of the given public to which they belong, feel simultaneously the same way in regard to the destruction of anything that belongs to that public, and express their feelings and opinions simultaneously, being aware at the same time that the other members of that public are experiencing the same feelings and giving expression to the same opinions.

⁴ *La foule criminelle*, p. 225.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 225, 226; cf. Tarde, G., *Le public et la foule*, Ch. I.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 241. "Sans doute chaque public produit les journalistes qui ont ses instincts, ses tendances ses qualities, et ses défauts, qui sont, in un mot, es creatures."

The public is not subject, however, to all of the weaknesses of the crowd. An individual can belong to only one crowd at a time, but he usually can claim membership in several publics at the same moment. He may belong simultaneously to a Roosevelt public, a Billy Sunday public, a Ty Cobb public, and a John McCormack public. His interests as a member of one public may run counter to his interests as a member of another public; hence, he will act more normally than when a member of a single face-to-face group. This century is becoming an "era of publics"; the public is superseding the crowd as a prevalent form of grouping.

III.

Conflicts between groups are outstanding social phenomena; they arise from the operation of the fighting instinct (discussed in Chapter Three). This instinct in the individual when joined with the same tendencies in other individuals assumes mass proportions, organized methods, and group significance. Families compete against families for social standing, business vies with business for trade, and nations struggle against nations for territorial expansion and commercial advancement.

Conflicts go on continually between the individual and his group. An individual becomes a leader of a clientele and the conflict becomes one between a minority section and the parent group. A new idea

springs from some one's mind, finds expression, and immediately individuals begin to align themselves with or against the new propaganda. The leader and the adherents of the new program enter into conflict with the parent organization.

Conflicts between groups are sometimes open and announced, as in the case of political parties in a national election. They are frequently conducted under cover and behind apparently friendly advances, e. g., rivalries between certain business houses. Even in open political fights, it is often difficult to learn the attitude of various influential organizations, because of secret alliances and agreements.

Certain conflicts are highly destructive; others are mutually advantageous. The conflict between a powerful corporation and a competitive individual entrepreneur usually ends in the destruction or at least the absorption of the small business of the individual competitor by the corporation. Two neighboring farmers, however, who are competing for honors in regard to corn yield per acre will both gain, as well as society; two granges in competition will also both reap advantages with no losses because of the competition.

Conflict between groups is an element of progress, unless the conflict becomes too unequal, unless it assumes the form of competitive consumption of goods, both economic and uneconomic, or unless it fails to rise to high, open, and meritorious levels. Conflict between marked unequals results in the annihilation of

the lesser unequal, and in no appreciable gain to the other. Competition in the consumption of socially valuable goods instead of competition in the production of human values, is socially disintegrating. Conflicts which resort to deception, to physical combat, instead of to increased openness and to a national measuring of values, lead to barbarism and savagery.

No conflict would mean no group progress. But conflicts must be kept within the lines of progress, directed and made to serve socially constructive ends exclusively. It is at this point that Professor T. N. Carver's theory of social progress through conflict should be discussed.⁷ While Professor Carver recognizes an evolution in the forms of conflict, he assumes that the group, and particularly a territorial group, is an end in itself. He starts with the elemental type of conflict, mainly destructive, and familiar to us as war, sabotage, and duelling. A higher form is deception, which like the first type is a characteristic of brutes, and is found among human beings in skillful ways of swindling, counterfeiting, and adulterating. A third, higher, and distinctly human form of conflict is persuasion, such as legal (litigating), as political (campaigning), as erotic (courting), and as commercial (selling). Then there is competitive consumption, competitive bargaining, and competitive production in the economic realm. Competitive production of goods

⁷ *Essays in Social Justice*, Ch. IV.

always works well; both competitors and the given social group gain. Beyond this point, the analysis does not go; it needs to be developed in its psychological and sociological phases. It emphasizes the biological bases of conflict; it stresses the survival of the fittest in the sense of the survival of the strongest; it deals little with conflicts between motives, moral standards, and societary values. It is difficult to see how a group whose highest activity is competitive production of economic goods could avoid the present world-wide condemnation that has fallen upon Germany.

As the economic struggle for existence bulks large in Professor Carver's writings, so psychological conflicts are stressed by Tarde.⁸ To Tarde there are three leading forms of conflict, or opposition, namely, political, economic, and social; or war, competition, and discussion,—terms which are used to indicate a decreasing degree of destructive action and an ascending scale of constructive opposition. War and competition are usually destructive (the social value of competitive production of economic goods is underrated); discussion is generally constructive (the deception which sometimes underlies discussion and the wasteful character of much discussion are not clearly indicated by Tarde).

Professor F. H. Giddings has shown how conflicts between groups that are somewhat evenly balanced (secondary conflicts), lead to progress, because out of

⁸ *L'opposition universelle.*

conflict between more or less equal forces arise tolerance and compromise, then co-operation, alliance, and mutual aid.⁹ Conflict as being the best way to remove the dualism between opposing social forces and to arrive at some form of unity¹⁰ is a satisfactory statement, providing it is understood that the conflict is to take place upon ascending levels of rationality. Professor G. Simmel speaks of the whole history of society in terms of the striking conflicts which have occurred between socialistic adaptation to society and individualistic departure from its demands,—a duality which is manifested biologically in the contrast between heredity and variation, also, a duality between heredity and environment, or, as Tarde put it, a duality between imitation (heredity) and opposition (environment). Professors G. Ratzenhofer¹¹ and A. W. Small¹² have treated conflict and co-operation as more or less correlative terms in the processes of social adjustment. The element of conflict always appears in every new situation, but the line of progress is from a maximum of conflict to a maximum of reciprocity.¹³ Durkheim has pointed out how opposing groups (subdivided so-

⁹ *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 100 ff.

¹⁰ Simmel, G., "Sociology of Conflict," *Amer. Jour. of Sociol.*, IX: 490.

¹¹ *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*.

¹² *General Sociology*.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

cial interests) find it necessary to combine in order to advance.¹⁴

In a brief summary it may be said that group conflicts function as means to a social end, operate in the long run upon an ascending scale (war, competition, discussion), and give way to the rise of co-operation, alliance, and mutual aid. They arise out of the fighting tendencies, and run the gamut from brutal ruthlessness to that high type of corrective effort which is an expression of love. They may personify the "tooth and claw" ways of the jungle, or the kindly, but firm methods of a loving parent, and the high-minded, international convictions of a great state; or any of the intergradations.

IV.

In every group, no matter how many intra-groups it may harbor, there is continuous expression of the gregarious instinct, of the spirit of toleration, and of the desire for co-operation. There is an ever present group, or social consciousness; and in a sense, a social mind.

It is in the play-day of childhood that social sympathy, a social sense, and social habits are evolved.¹⁵ It is assumed here that man is inherently social, that he is, in a sense, a product of group life, and that beneath anti-social activities there is a deep-seated gre-

¹⁴ *De la division du travail social.*

¹⁵ Giddings, F. H., *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 117 ff.

gamous nature. In associating with others, we develop our dormant social nature. Through association, there arises toleration; what we first oppose, we may later learn to tolerate. In associating and in tolerating, we learn to appreciate the merits of others, to understand their weaknesses, and to develop a fellow-feeling.

In associating with the fellow members of our own groups, we learn that they have the same feelings, the same thoughts, and the same willingness to act as we. As a result of this reorganization of attitude we learn to feel, think, and act in harmony with others; by a like process, others acquire similar harmonious reactions to us. Public feelings, opinions, and actions, thus, assume tangible form and force.

The opinions of the group tend to survive; the most useful do survive. The best current opinion becomes the established opinion in later years; it gathers prestige with time. Into this mass of integrated past public opinion and of formulating current opinion, the child is born; in this psychic environment he grows up, and from it his own thinking receives its direction. Later, his individual reaction against some of the elements in this combination of past and present group opinion gives him an opportunity for leadership. Or, he may develop into a leader through championing some factor in the established group opinion. The subject of leadership, however, will receive analysis in the next chapter.

Integrated past opinion and floating, misty, current public opinion center about certain vital phases of group life. Specific social values arise. A fundamental social value is the existence of the group itself; each group holds its own life as an elemental social value. A corollary to the preceding proposition is that the group will fight for its own unity,—witness the case of the United States in 1861 to 1865. Lack of group unity presages group disintegration.

Group life, group unity, and distinctive group possessions, material and spiritual, compose the triune of social values thus far developed in group life. The most important form of the material possessions of the group is its geographic territory. "An abiding affection for the fatherland" and for principles of liberty, of opportunity, and of fraternity which the group may have worked out, represent the highest social values.¹⁶ Patriotism is a tangible group response when any one of the social values is attacked. Real patriotism consists in a continuous expression of group loyalty, whether the group values are under special attack or not. It shows itself in socially constructive ways in the daily activities of life, and in continuous attention by individuals to the evolution of group values.

Patriotism means group loyalty. It originally referred to loyalty to the family, or more particularly, loyalty to the *pater*, or patriarchal head of the family.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* pp. 147 ff.

Patriotism was synonymous with patriarchalism and with "familism." In the hey-day of tribal society, patriotism implied loyalty to the tribe; patriotism and tribalism were interchangeable terms. With the rise of the nation, a still broader type of group loyalty developed, namely, nationalism, or patriotism in the nineteenth century sense of the term. Familism and tribalism in a modified way take subordinate but vital places in the enlarged form of group loyalty known as nationalism.

The most powerful group consciousness that has yet developed is that form of national patriotism which arises in connection with national defense and national attack, which at first is usually highly emotional and charged with electrical feelings but which later settles down, if need be, into a stubborn struggle for group existence. It not infrequently suffers abuse; pseudo-patriotism is common. The pseudo-patriot hoists the flag but locks up coal in his mines while women and children sicken and die from the cold; he buys up foodstuffs, and holds them while prices rise and people starve. Pseudo-patriotism exhausts itself in applause of the flag, or in patriotic statements. It whines when asked to observe meatless days; it squanders money in luxury; it wastes strength in sinful living. It carries the flag as a form of camouflage—to cover up profiteering and self indulgence; it is a hypocritical loyalty that may be as vicious as traitorism.

In addition to loyalty to family (familism), to local district, or community (a modified type of tribalism), and to nation (nationalism), the trend of social evolution is bringing a still higher type of patriotism into the foreground, namely, internationalism, or loyalty to the world group. We are on the verge of forming an international consciousness and a sense of planetary values; the new point of view is developed in recent books such as those by Professors Edward Krehbiel¹⁷ and Thorstein Veblen.¹⁸ President Wilson's now famous plea for world-wide democracy is a forerunner of the rise of planetary loyalty.

Further, philosophy and religion have formulated still more comprehensive group loyalties. For example, Christianity has dared to project a loyalty which includes not only the present world society, but also that unnumbered host who have run well and finished this earthly race, in fact a vast society of which the earthly group is but a single manifestation. Christianity has been so radical that unto familism, tribalism, nationalism, internationalism, it has added universalism in the sense of a loyalty to a society (the Kingdom of God) incomprehensive in size and character, without beginning and without end.

¹⁷*Nationalism, War and Society.*

¹⁸*The Nature of Peace.*

PROBLEMS

(PERMANENT GROUPS)

1. Define a group.
2. Distinguish between a permanent group and a temporary group.
3. How are the sexes different psychically?
4. How is a fraternal group different from a neighborhood group psychically?
5. What is meant by the psychology of an occupation?
6. What are the psychical differences between a rural and an urban group?
7. Explain: "The high potential of a city."
8. Would you say that the capital of a commonwealth should "be its chief city, or some centrally located town"?
9. Distinguish between the psychical characteristics of Boston, New York, and Washington, the intellectual, business, and political capitals, respectively, of this country.

(TEMPORARY GROUPS, THE CROWD)

10. Define a "crowd."
11. Distinguish between a homeogeneous and a heterogeneous crowd.
12. Why does the crowd generally have a leader?
13. If a crowd does not have a leader, what will it do?

14. Why is one's individuality "wilted in a dense throng"?

15. Why do feelings run through a crowd more readily than ideas?

16. In order to unify men, why is it necessary to touch the chord of feeling?

17. Why is the crowd-self irrational?

18. Explain: "In a psychological crowd, people are out of themselves."

19. Explain: The crowd is recidivistic.

20. Does a crowd tolerate freedom of speech? Why?

21. Why is the crowd-self ephemeral?

22. What is the relation of Roberts' Rules of Order to the impulses of the crowd?

23. Explain: "The squeeze of the crowd tends to depress the self-sense."

24. Is a jury a crowd, or a mere group of individuals?

25. Explain: "A great deal of so-called patriotism is but the crowd-emotion of the nation."

26. Are your highest emotions aroused more easily when you are in a crowd than when you are alone?

27. What effect will your study of the psychology of the crowd have upon your attitude toward the crowd?

28. Distinguish between a crowd and a mob.

29. What is the meaning of the word, mob?

30. Is a holiday jam in a railroad station a mob?

31. Is the psychology of a mob of Hottentots the same as the psychology of a mob of college professors?

32. Where can the blame for mob action be justly placed?

33. What are the best means for bringing a mob to a rational point of view?

34. Define an assembly.

35. Why is it easier to speak to an audience of 200 people than to a group of twenty persons?

36. Define a public.

37. Explain: This is an era of publics.

38. Illustrate a conflict (a) between an individual and his group, (b) between two groups of equal strength, (c) between a small group and a large group of which the small group is a part.

39. Illustrate competitive consumption of goods.

40. Illustrate competitive production.

41. Why do battles always take place between two armies, or between two sets of opposing armies, and not between three or four mutually opposing armies?

42. Why is discussion able to "hurry conflicts to a conclusion?"

43. When is a discussion profitless?

44. What are the leading foes of new ideas?

45. Would you expect to find the truth of the matter in a given discussion with either extremist?

46. Should a false dogma be attacked directly, or undermined "by marshalling and interpreting the adverse facts"?

47. Should the chief basis for religious fellowship be "agreement in belief or agreement in ideal"?

48. Should a conflict between types of water filtration or armor plate be referred to the voters?

49. What types of public questions should be submitted to the voters for a decision?

50. Why have theological controversies been more bitter than scientific controversies?

51. What are the strong and weak points of compromising?

(GROUP AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS)

52. What is meant by "group memory"?

53. Why does the morality of diplomacy and war lag behind the morality of individuals?

54. Why do woman's legal rights "lag behind her generally acknowledged moral rights"?

55. Define group loyalty.

56. What is a traitor?

57. What is the history of patriotism?

58. What are the leading types of patriotism?

59. Can a good patriot be a bad citizen?

60. How do you rate the patriotism in the sentiment: "My country, right or wrong."

61. Do you agree with Professor Veblen's statement: "Patriotism is useful for breaking the peace, not for keeping it."

62. Distinguish between instinctive and reflective patriotism.

63. What is the relation of patriotism to nationalism?

64. Distinguish between nationalism and internationalism.

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CHAPTER VII.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVENTION AND OF LEADERSHIP

I.

Invention and leadership are closely related phenomena. Leadership, in the broad sense, includes inventing, discovering, prophesying, organizing, and directing natural and social forces. The psychology of leadership rests upon the psychology of invention.

Invention means "coming upon," "seeing into," and perceiving new relationships. The history of invention is concerned not "with the unoriginal moments of any man's life, nor with the stolid procession that never had a thought of their own," but with the bright, happy, creative moments of the best minds of all races and with the most beneficent contributions to the progress of mankind.¹

Invention and imitation are opposite poles of the same process; every imitation results in at least a slight modification, or invention. The copying of the

¹ Mason, O. T., *Origins of Invention*, p. 28.

actions of another involves the personal equation of the one who imitates; to the extent that the individuality of the imitator finds expression in the process, the imitation is accompanied by invention. As suggestion is the initiating phase of imitation, so imitation is often the introductory element in invention. As the imitator sees life at a different angle from the imitated, he may unconsciously, if not consciously, incorporate new elements into the process,—which is the essence of invention.

Invention arises out of individual needs, out of problems, out of attempts to extricate oneself from difficulties. The starting point is always a problem; the next essential is a desire to solve the problem; then collection and analysis of data are necessary; finally, a new and useful relationship becomes clear. The inventor may come upon an entirely unexpected relationship; the invention may not be the one for which the long search has been made. But the seeking, searching, inquiring is fundamental to all invention and discovery. A desire, or a problem, concentration of attention, the trial and error method, finally the anticipated, or an unanticipated discovery of relationships,—such is the nature of invention. The possibilities of making worthy inventions are open, hence, to any energetic mind.

An invention is generally not much more than an improvement upon some past method of doing. It is said that the United States Patent Office uses a two-

fold classification, namely, improvements, and inventions, and that nearly all new ideas and appliances that come to the Patent Office fall under the heading of improvements rather than of inventions.

The invention of the steam engine was not made in the year 1769 by James Watt, neither was it made on the day that the attention of Watt was centered upon the rising lid of the tea-kettle. The invention of the steam engine goes back to the aelipile made by Hero of Alexandria (second century, B. C.), to a type of steam windmill made by G. Branca (1629), to the steam apparatus made by the Marquis of Worcester (1663), to the application of steam power to various kinds of machines by Thomas Savery (about 1700), to Papin's idea of the piston, to Newcomen's piston engine, a model of which Watt was repairing when in 1763 he set to work to eliminate the waste of steam due to alternate chilling and heating of the cylinder. With this problem before him, Watt worked for six years before he had perfected the separate condenser in 1769, the date at which it is popularly said that the steam engine was invented. This invention involved more than observation of the lid of a tea-kettle; it included countless improvements made by many minds through a long period of time.

The improvements which constitute inventions are of three classes: (1) natural evolutions, (2) transfor-

mations, and (3) marked deviations;² the order of statement forms an ascending scale, qualitatively, and a descending series, numerically. Inventions that are natural evolutions of previously discovered relationships are the easiest to make and the most common. Some inventions are complex combinations of known relationships; the results are transformations of the constituent ideas, methods and principles. Then there are the marked deviations from current ideas; these are the outstanding inventions; they involve the recognition of relationships apparently unrelated; they include the brilliant conceptions of geniuses.

There is psychologically no essential difference between inventing and discovering. Consider the discovery of America: first, there was a problem, namely, to travel by direct route to India; then, the brilliant idea that Europe was related to or connected with India by the western seas; then, the search, the long journey, the steadfast westward gaze; finally, land, not India, but a new continent.

II.

To invention and discovery, leadership may now be added. The leader is the social inventor and discoverer. Leadership involves societary problems, concentrated attention upon these problems, trial and error methods, seeking and searching for correct solu-

² Paulhan, F., *Psychologie de l'invention*, livre II.

tions, and the discovery of new societal programs. It is the aim of this section to consider the types of leadership, and of the following section to state and explain the qualities of leadership.

From one point of view, leadership is of two types, that which drives others and that which draws others. In a military, autocratic country, the former type predominates; in a democratic nation, the latter form receives recognition. He who drives others is usually a representative of a powerful organization. He personifies borrowed force; he appropriates ways, frequently autocratic ways, from the institution which fosters him. On the other hand, the leader who draws, must be human. He must be one of the herd and like a good shepherd; he must not get too far ahead of the group lest its members fail to recognize him as one of their kind.

In another way, there are two types of leaders; the executive, and the intellectual. The executive is usually characterized by greater physical force, "push," and energy, but by less breadth of knowledge and by less depth in theoretical thinking than the intellectual leader. He is more interested in people, is in closer contact with life, and is more red-blooded. He generally commands the higher salary, and receives recognition from society sooner than does the leader in the fields of literary and scientific endeavor. The intellectual leader usually works for ends farther removed,

leads a less exhaustive life, commands greater freedom and enjoyment, and often is rated higher by succeeding generations.

In a third sense, leaders may be divided into four classes: (a) the crowd exponent, (b) the crowd representative, (c) the crowd compeller, and (d) the group builder. This classification adds a fourth type of leadership to the three-fold division made by Sir Martin Conway.³ The crowd exponent observes the needs of the group, crystalizes the vague desires, and leads the group in obtaining satisfaction for these wants. He is sensitive to the group emotions and is able to express clearly the inchoate group desires and, by oratorical methods, to obtain wide popularity.

The crowd representative functions in expressing the more or less clearly expressed will of the people. A judge is a crowd representative. Under the democratic form of a republican type of government, the legislator is expected to represent public opinion.

The crowd compeller leads the group, frequently, after false gods, and for purposes of personal gain and glory; Caesar and Napoleon are outstanding examples. The crowd compeller forces his will upon the group, instead of being the spokesman of the will of the group (the crowd representative), or the personification of the unexpressed feelings of the group (the crowd exponent). The crowd compeller hypnotizes his constit-

³ *The Crowd in Peace and War*, Chs. VI-VIII.

uents, drives them hither and yon at vital sacrifices to themselves, and not infrequently ends his career in failure. His strength is in his hypnotic influence; when that fails he is lost. No leader can finally succeed who stamps out or smothers the self-expression of the group members.

The group builder, in the deepest sense of the term, has the best interests of the group uppermost in his mind and heart; his interest is in the welfare of individuals and in the permanent advancement of the group. He analyzes the needs of the group, finds out the lines of probable progress, and dares to lead. He determines the causes of group maladjustments, outlines steps of reconstruction, and pilots the way. No better illustration could be given than by referring to Washington.

III.

Of the various specific characteristics of a successful leader, (1) a fine physique is essential for certain types of leadership, and helpful in all. Napoleon, however, was compensated for the lack of physique by possessing tremendous energy. A high degree (2) of physical energy and endurance is a corollary of leadership.

More important, perhaps, is (3) what Ward has aptly called the focalization of psychic energy.⁴ The genius is a person whose psychic energy is highly focal-

⁴ *Pure Sociology*, p. 36; Ch. XVIII.

ized. If the process has been carried out by nature, the born-genius is the result; if effected by the individual himself, the genius by virtue of hard work and concentration develops. The first is a genius by inheritance; the second, by his own initiative. The former are relatively few and society is often wasteful of them; the latter are more numerous, but the percentage who attain prominence is small. If nature has not focalized one's psychic energy for him and made him a genius, he may have the opportunity of focalizing his own psychic energy and of becoming a genius.

A leader must be, also, (4) a "moral dynamo," if he is to succeed in a way worth while. He must command confidence and respect, in a greater degree than does an ordinary person. Ideally, he must be master of himself, before he can command the respect and actions of others. To the extent that he is not in supreme control of his own passions and desires, he is handicapped in controlling other people. He must have (5) faith in himself, possess a certain initiative and daring, exhibit poise, indifference, and self-control under danger, and by virtue of this superior faith and poise, remain somewhat inscrutable.

The leader must be (6) a seer. He must see clearly the real needs of his times; he must perceive them more clearly than do his fellows. His foresight must be superior to that of his fellows. If he can see through the problems of his group to their adequate, practical solution, his leadership is at once assured.

The biologists and students of heredity have not offered, as yet, a satisfactory explanation of the appearance of special talent and of genius. The underlying causes are not known; special ability is as likely, or almost as likely, to appear in a child born in a tenement as in one born in a mansion. Its appearance is not confined to one sex; no one knows how much ability is possessed by woman, for, historically, woman has not had opportunity to translate her latent talent into achievement.

In addition to the inherited and acquired individual characteristics of leadership, there are social conditions which determine whether or not talent will actually materialize in the form of achievement. It is generally agreed—a point of vast importance—that more geniuses are born than ever attain a place of eminence. The position of Galton that potential genius does not exist, or that every genius will overcome his environment and attain prominence,⁵ is generally discredited. The contention of Lombroso that the genius is a pathological phenomenon, to be treated as a mental degenerate, or even as an insane person,⁶ is without scientific standing.

Granted, then, that more geniuses are born than become eminent, the question arises: What are the necessary conditions for the maturing of genius? Sev-

⁵ *Hereditary Genius.*

⁶ *The Man of Genius.*

eral studies of considerable extent and keen insight have been made; a fairly satisfactory answer is available. Odin⁷, Ward⁸, and recently, G. R. Davies⁹, have shown with increasing exactness that the decisive factors in transforming inherited talent and special ability of all degrees into actual achievement are four: "(1) centers of population containing special intellectual stimuli and facilities; (2) ample material means insuring freedom from care, economic security, leisure, and the wherewithal to supply the apparatus of research; (3) a social position such as is capable of producing a sense of self-respect, dignity, and reserve power which alone can inspire confidence in one's worth and in one's right to enter the lists for the great prizes of life; (4) careful and prolonged intellectual training during youth, whereby all the fields of achievement become familiar and a choice of them possible in harmony with intellectual proclivities and tastes."¹⁰ Genius, then, appears in all classes and strata of society. Genius tends to create its own opportunities, but often fails. Education, however, of all classes will create more opportunities for the development and expression of talent and genius than talent and genius can make for themselves.

⁷ *Genèse des grands hommes*.

⁸ *Applied Sociology*, Pt. II.

⁹ *Social Environment*, Ch. IV.

¹⁰ Ward, *ibid.*, p. 224.

In times of unrest, change, and transition, leadership is at a premium. In times of grave social distress, the autocratic type of leader is the hero; in periods of gradual social evolution, the leader of the "attracting" type is the effective director of human events. Because so much of the world's history has been marked by social revolution, because the world loves the heroic and spectacular, the hero type of leadership has been exalted and the "attracting" type underrated. Under any circumstances, the problem-solver becomes the effective leader, and the world's problem-solvers become the world's leaders. The world, on the other hand, must provide society-wide education and related advantages in order that problem-solving ability may have adequate opportunities of expression. The world's problem-solvers who succeed farthest in turning human achievement into human improvement, and who are the most successful in enriching the quality of human experience are the world's greatest leaders.

PROBLEMS

(INVENTION)

1. What psychological characteristics are basic in the make-up of the inventor?
2. Can inventiveness be taught?
3. If so, what method of instruction should be used?

4. Which is the chief inspiration of the inventor:
(a) to secure personal satisfaction; (b) to earn money;
or, (c) to render public service?

5. Explain: "Invention is as natural as imitation."

6. Explain: Inventions are rare but "those who
are really qualified to use inventions are also rare."

7. Distinguish between invention, discovery, and
leadership.

8. Distinguish between copying and adapting the
methods of others?

(TYPES AND QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP)

9. How would you define leadership?

10. Whom do you consider the five greatest lead-
ers in the United States at the present time?

11. What is meant by "individual ascendancy" as
opposed to "social ascendancy"?

12. What is the relation of physique and of energy
to leadership?

13. Explain: A leader represents a focalization of
psychic energy.

14. Explain: It is the work of a leader "to pull
triggers in the minds of his followers."

15. Explain: "The successful shepherd thinks like
his sheep."

16. Distinguish between the intellectual and the
executive type of leadership.

17. Are boys reared in wealthy homes, or in poor
homes, "the more likely to become executives"?

18. Should a leader draw or drive people?

19. Does progress in social stability and security "lessen the hero values of the leader, and exalt his directive capacity"?

20. Which is the better type of leadership, that which presents fully developed programs to the people, or that which stimulates the people to suggest and develop programs themselves?

21. Can a student do a high-grade of assigned and mapped-out work in several college classes, and at the same time develop qualities of leadership?

22. Should an elected representative of the people really represent the wishes of his constituents, or should he exercise his own judgment?

23. Is "the control of patronage" a source of strength to a statesman?

24. Should a general go to the front when technically he can direct the fighting better from the distant headquarters?

25. How can a leader of splendid ability but of "dissolute habits" be prevented from "demoralizing" the group?

26. Explain: Leadership assumes maximum importance in times of transition.

27. What are the basic qualities of a successful public speaker?

28. What are the main characteristics of a successful advertiser?

29. What are the differences in convincing an individual in the class-room, and in convincing him when he is a member of a crowd?

30. What is meant by the aristocracy of achieving?

31. What is meant by the "great man" theory of progress?

32. Explain: There is no such person as a self-made man.

33. Have "all advances in civilization" been due to leaders?

34. Would you say that "the obtrusiveness of personality and temperament in literature, painting, and music is a sign of advancement or a mark of backwardness"?

35. Should leadership in the family be centered in one person, or should the leadership be divided?

36. Do women generally vote as their husbands? Should they vote in an opposite way?

37. Are the rural or the urban communities in the United States in the greater need of leadership?

38. Why are some of the world's most valuable leaders unpopular?

39. When should a leader be an agitator, and when should he be a compromiser?

40. Would a course in Leadership, or in the Psychology of Leadership, have a useful place in the college curriculum?

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CHAPTER VIII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONTROL AND OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

I.

Individual initiative continually conflicts with social standards. As a consequence, the individual is subject to many types of social restraint. Many of these social controls have arisen from past group experiences, but these experiences are not always safe guides with reference to limiting current individual action. Nearly all social controls have arisen blindly and have been put into operation without foresight. Social restraint has been rarely telic, in the sense that it is exercised with reference to carefully ascertained standards of group welfare. Nearly all forms of social control, however, embody more wisdom than their haphazard manner of development would imply.

Social control is essential to progress. Every group exercises control over its members as a matter of group self-protection and in order that the energy of the members may not be directed in socially disintegrating ways. It is an encouraging sign when a group no

longer relies entirely upon the blind use of controls, but begins to determine the positive, constructive, and purposive lines of progress. It is a hopeful day when a group sets about to learn the direction in which its greatest usefulness and development lies and consciously begins to direct its methods of social restraint and of social encouragement to those ends.

Social controls are usually too rigid in certain particulars, too lax in other ways, and too haphazard in many regards. Because social controls generally operate as objective instruments, the individual is frequently misjudged, is coerced unjustly, and is inadvertently encouraged to foment centers of social sedition; moreover, he is inadequately stimulated to make his best contributions to his group and to society.

Consequently, these exceedingly practical and vital questions from the standpoint of group advance continually arise: (1) How much social control shall a group exercise over its members in regard to a given new idea? (2) What shall be the nature of this control? (3) How shall it be applied? If too much control is exercised, individual initiative is stifled and progress halted; if too little restraint is employed, group cohesion is endangered, and social chaos is a possible result. The problem is not only one of quantity of control, but also a matter of quality of control. For example, what kind of control shall a parent use over a child who objectively is telling "stories," but subjectively is giving his imagination free rein? Shall

the teacher use the same variety of control in handling a mischievous boy who is bubbling over with energy as in dealing with one who is deceitful? Shall society use the same controls in prescribing treatment for an obstreperous fanatic as for a delinquent corporation? Also, shall controls be applied bluntly and directly, or shall they be exercised through those who are to be controlled, and hence indirectly?

Public opinion is a powerful agent of control. Its merits and demerits have been pointed out by Ross¹, Tarde², Sighele³, and others. Public opinion functions immediately; there is no delay as in the case of law. It is an inexpensive control. It is preventive, for individuals fear it, and accordingly modify their conduct. It is less mechanical than law, strikes into the hidden and secret places of individual conduct, attacks motives.

On the other hand, public opinion is frequently muddled. It is not precise; it is not codified. It possesses "a short wrath and a poor memory." It rarely represents group unanimity; an offender can always find some members of the group in whose opinions his offense is condoned, excused, or even praised. When responsibility is shifted as is done sometimes in the case of corporate conduct, public opinion becomes confused

¹ *Social Control*, Ch. X; also, *Social Psychology*, Ch. XXII.

² *L'opinion et la foule*.

³ *La foule criminelle*.

and the guilty persons escape its lash. Public opinion is primitive, fitful, and "passional" in its methods.

Law as a form of social control has already been mentioned in comparison with public opinion. The strong points of law as a method of exercising social restraint are that it is codified, that it is preventive, and that it operates with a certain surety. Its machinery often moves with provoking slowness; it does not search the subjective phases of conduct; and its power is frequently paralyzed by the financial, social, or political power of the offender.

Personal beliefs of the individual operate as a social control. Through his home, religious, and educational life, the individual acquires certain personal beliefs which determine his conduct to a large extent. As a result of these beliefs which he holds, he prides himself upon making his own decisions, whereas, commonly, the various groups of which he has been a member—through their teachings—have fundamentally made his decisions for him; he is not "self-made" to the degree that the term implies.

Personal religious beliefs, according to which the individual lives continuously under the direction of an all-powerful Being whose eye "seeth in secret," operate with effectiveness. Law and public opinion can be dodged, but not a Judge who is all-seeing, all-knowing, and all-powerful.

Ceremony, ritual, taboo, and art forms are used as methods of control. The prestige of custom is a strong

factor in group coercion. Conscious and unconscious imitation of the factors in the current social environment is a positive element of control.

Unquestionably the best treatise upon the subject of social control has been written by Professor Ross.⁴ But in this and similar discussions, the constructive function of group control has been under-emphasized. While historically it is true that social control has amounted to little more than social restraint, there is increasing evidence to show that group control ought to function as a form of social encouragement. It has made itself felt directly upon the borderlines of the group where individuals of initiative are conspicuous, but only in indirect ways upon the central mass. A proper function of social control is that of stimulating every member, not only to contribute to group welfare, but also to make the given group socially useful.

It has operated as an instrument of repression, prohibition, and negation; it should assume organized and rationalized constructive tendencies. It has carried the rôle of a "Thou Shalt Not" throughout human history; it is beginning to take on characteristics of social construction. In other words, negative social control must share the field with positive social control,—to use terms which have been suggested to the writer by Professor George Elliott Howard.

⁴*Social Control.*

The importance of a positive social control has been overlooked by many well-known authors. Social control of a positive type stimulates individuals to contribute their best efforts in support of the development of society; in the highest sense, it is rational, scientific, and telic; it is synonymous with the constructive phases of "social telesis." It seeks to discover the underlying principles of progress; it works out programs of social advancement; it encourages all individuals everywhere to subordinate standards of individual success and power to ideals of societary welfare; and it strives constantly to change all anti- and non-social impulses into social attitudes.

Positive social control stimulates individuals to contribute to group welfare; it influences groups to subordinate their own advancement to that of the larger groups of which they are parts, and to society itself. Negative social control, on the other hand, has exercised a needed but inadequate and often misplaced influence upon individuals. It has unintentionally made the need stand out for a positive social control that would give to individuals in all strata of society adequate opportunities for self expression along all socialized lines of activity.

II.

Throughout the three preceding chapters and the first half of this chapter definite hints have been given from the standpoint of social psychology of a theory

of social progress. There remains, in this concluding section, the need of summarizing and of stating more exactly this theory. Social progress depends upon the amount, quality, and method of application of social control, upon the degree of encouragement as well as of restraint which the group exercises with reference to individuals, and upon the extent, quality, and persistence of individual initiative, inventiveness, and leadership.

Too much restraint means the development of a social crust and of group stupefaction. If there be sufficient individual vitality and initiative, unrest will arise, revolutions will ensue, and the social crust will be broken. Thus through revolutions involving suffering, loss of life, and social chaos, the group will progress. If, however, individual enterprise be too weakened and if the body politic has become too flabby, then the crust will thicken and group life will be smothered. If too little or too inadequate control be employed, the centrifugal forces will gain undue power, anarchistic tendencies will increase, and social disintegration will result.

Social progress depends, then, upon individual initiative and leadership and upon the forces of social control. These two sets of forces interact in countless ways. The individual, upon the basis of the cultural development of his day, comes upon, accidentally, or finds after a carefully directed search, a new idea, or

method. This new idea must pass the test of social criticism. If its adoption means the giving up of a considerable section of customary methods on the part of the group members, then a conflict follows. The new is championed by leaders; the old likewise is represented by chivalric defenders. The conflict may be long and drawn out, or short and swift. If the degree of social control be at all normal and if the new program be of genuine superiority, then it will win its way to group adoption. Upon the basis of this new cultural advance, still better ideas will be discovered, at which time the process that has been described must be repeated over again. Thus, the individual initiates, invents, and leads, and the group follows, adopts, and supports new methods.

Conflict is necessary for both individual and social progress; it is conflict which gives zest to life, which prompts the highest expressions of individual initiative, which brings forth co-ordinated action.

The conflict must not take place between forces markedly unequal, lest the weaker be destroyed, and the stronger grow soft and flabby through lack of competition. To be most advantageous, conflict must occur between somewhat equal forces.

Further, conflict must be subject to social rules, or else it will degenerate and end upon the basis of the lowest forms of physical might and power. These regulations and agreements must keep conflict within

the bounds of productive effort—upon physical, economic, mental, spiritual planes.

Within groups, conflicts must be kept open between the official forces and the unofficial organizations. Private associations must always be free to compete with the public or governmental organizations. The political party in power needs continuously to face the honest criticism of parties not in power. Two sets of economic enterprise are essential, governmental ownership and private ownership; but neither in itself alone contains the elements of prolonged social progress. If taken together, the one works for the public interests, the other secures a high degree of private initiative. But if either were to come into supreme power, group retrogression and degeneration would set in. With all economic resources owned and operated by the government a powerful class control would result and individual initiative would be enslaved. With all economic resources owned by a few gigantic interlocking monopolies, the government would be shackled and put in economic chains, and public welfare would be made subservient to the caprices of the privileged few. The dual existence and operation of public and private organizations must be maintained. The conflict between them must be circumscribed by rules which will keep the competition away from the plane of physical might and upon the high levels of productive and social merit. Neither complete socialism nor complete individualism alone will guarantee progress. Neither alone

allows for that degree of conflict which is essential to group advancement. Private associations are needed to experiment with new ideas, to initiate new movements, and to prod up the public authorities, keeping them upon high levels of efficiency. The public, or official, organization is needed for the maintenance of the public point of view.

In a similar way, the progress of the whole world depends upon a balanced co-operation between large group, or national, units, and the international group, or mankind as a whole. Any world order is unstable that rests upon forty-eight sovereign groups, each deciding what is right, honorable, and just for the other forty-seven, and regulated by no inclusive or international authority. The nature and direction of human progress during the past millenium indicate clearly the need for the establishment of a world or international authority, an international constabulary, a planetary public opinion, a sense of planetary values, and a telic program for world progress.

National units must give up a definite portion of their present sovereign authority to an international authority; national conflicts must not go on upon the destructive levels of physical combat or the destructive planes of economic competition, but upon levels of productive competition and social benefit. The national units must share their power with a new world-inclusive organization which shall set the rules for all intra-conflicts; each intra-unit must then play according to the

rules of the game and within the bounds determined by economically productive and socially meritorious standards.

The group in order that it may progress steadily, must determine the direction which its development may best take. It must also decide continually upon the types of control which it shall use in regard to each group problem that arises. It must, further, put a premium upon individual initiative, new ideas, new methods, new inventions along the lines of its chosen path of development. The highest lines of telic advances lie in the direction of world-wide, planetary human welfare.

Such a trend involves the rise of sociocratic thinking, according to which all processes, even the most intellectual, must be subordinated to the standard embodied in the development and satisfaction of the progressive and socialized needs of others.

PROBLEMS

1. What is the meaning of social control?
2. Give a concrete illustration in which you have felt the effect of group coercion.
3. Is more social control needed in a dense or in a sparse population?
4. In a homogeneous or heterogeneous population?
5. In time of war or of peace?
6. In a society stratified by classes or in a society not so stratified?

7. Is more or less social control needed in the United States today?

8. What are the dangers (a) of too little social control; (b) of too much control?

9. On what occasions does public opinion arise?

10. What are (a) the advantages of public opinion, and (b) the disadvantages of public opinion as a means of social control?

11. Is the sardonic newspaper cartoon more effective in moulding public opinion than the good-natured cartoon?

12. Which is the more effective in forming public opinion, the cartoon or the editorial?

13. What are (a) the advantages and (b) the disadvantages of law as a form of social restraint?

14. Why are the laws in the United States so easily broken?

15. What are the strong and the weak points of custom as a type of control?

16. To what leading customs are you subject at the present moment?

17. Does a religious institution or a business organization bind "its members more closely to custom"?

18. What is meant by the protective philosophy of a group?

19. Is it true that the members of a small group, no matter how meritorious its side of the question may be, are always called "traitors" and other opprobrious names, by an overwhelming majority?

20. Explain: The tyranny of the majority.

21. Distinguish between "the tyranny of the majority" and "the fatalism of the multitude."

22. Why are opprobrious names applied to refractory members of a group?

23. How do personal beliefs operate as a means of social restraint?

24. How generally are individuals aware of being under social control?

25. Wherein lies the need for social control?

26. Explain and illustrate: The state is more rapacious than it allows its citizens to be.

27. Who are the professionals whose business it is to keep up the social order?

28. Distinguish between caste control in India and class control in the United States.

29. Which standards do people think about the more, those of their own class, of the class above them, or, of the class below them?

30. What is the best way to estimate the volume of social control at any time in a given society?

31. Is there reason to believe that in years to come social control will be less necessary than now in the United States?

32. Is persecution a good method of securing control?

33. Is there a larger place for authority in settling public questions than in settling private questions?

34. Is it wrong to punish those who persist in folly that hurts only themselves?

35. Illustrate: "There never has been a society which did not tolerate or approve some conduct that was bad for it."

36. Which has the greater influence in developing a student, a large university, or a small college?

37. Why is education "the most efficient form of social control in modern society"?

38. What would be the effect of no social control on progress?

39. In what ways is there too much social control in this country, from the standpoint of securing progress?

40. In what connection would you urge more control in the United States with reference to accelerating progress?

41. Are the needs of the individual always in line with group advancement?

42. Are the needs of the nation always in harmony with international progress?

43. Why is it unwise to be either an "individualist" or a "socialist"—as these terms are commonly understood—in matters involving humanity-wide progress?

44. Is there any reason for thinking that the progress of civilization in the United States "narrows one's options in believing and judging," but increases one's opportunities for doing and enjoying?

45. What is meant by natural social progress?
Illustrate.

46. Explain and illustrate telic social progress.

47. Distinguish between causes of social revolution
and social evolution.

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